Schmitz

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Early in the evening of November 24, 2006, Deputy Sheriff Mihaela Mihai saw defendant‘s car turn into a dead-end alley lined with the garages of a

1 condominium complex. When defendant then made a U-turn, Mihai stopped alongside his car and asked whether he was lost. Defendant said no, that he had driven into the alley to avoid making a U-turn on the street. Mihai got out of her car and asked defendant for his driver‘s license. As defendant complied, Mihai observed that his arms were covered with abscesses, which she associated with drug use. Asked if defendant was on probation or parole, defendant said, ―No.‖ Mihai then asked him for permission to search the car. Defendant did not respond. Defendant had three passengers: a man in the front seat, and a woman and her small child in the back. The male passenger said he was on parole. Mihai searched the car on that basis after removing the occupants. In the backseat area, she found a syringe cap in a woman‘s purse,1 two syringes in a chips bag, and some methamphetamine in a pair of shoes. Defendant waived a preliminary hearing on resulting charges, but moved to suppress the evidence.2 The…

I concur in the judgment reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision, but I respectfully dissent from the reasons set forth by the majority. I would find that defendant Douglas George Schmitz has failed to preserve for appeal the question whether the parole search was valid.

At issue in this case is whether a deputy sheriff’s warrantless search of defendant’s car violated his constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. “[T]he most basic constitutional mle in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ ‘The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ ” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443 , 454—455 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ], fns. omitted.) The rule is the same under the state Constitution:…

As Justice Werdegar observes, “defendant failed in the trial court to challenge the applicability of the passenger’s parole search condition or the permissible scope of the warrant-less search . . . .” (Cone. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 934.) As a result, the record in this case is very limited. We know that the police officer conducted a search of the car based on the front seat passenger’s parole status. But we do not know what the officer asked, learned, or believed in the course of the search, even though such facts bear critically on whether the officer reasonably believed the areas and items searched were under the parolee’s control. Today’s opinion effectively deems such facts irrelevant to the lawfulness of the search and, in so doing, adopts a novel Fourth Amendment rule that may be broader than necessary to resolve the legality of what actually happened in this case. Because judicial restraint counsels against deciding constitutional questions when it is unnecessary to do so (see Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 , 902 P.2d 225 ]), I agree with Justice Werdegar that the prudent…

This case involves the constitutional limits of a vehicle search based on a passenger’s parole status. Here, an officer, aware that the front seat passenger was on parole, searched the backseat of defendant’s car and recovered drugs and drug paraphernalia from a chips bag and a pair of shoes. Defendant, the driver, sought to suppress that evidence. We conclude that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that the Constitution permits a search of those areas of the passenger compartment where the officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity. Additionally, the officer may search personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Early in the evening of November 24, 2006, Deputy Sheriff Mihaela Mihai saw defendant’s car turn into a dead-end alley lined with the garages of a condominium complex. When defendant then made a U-tum, Mihai stopped alongside his car and asked whether he was lost.…