Sanders

I. BACKGROUND

Officers conducting a parole search of defendant‟s residence discovered two operable shotguns and ammunition. Defendant was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony under section 12021(a)(1) (offender in possession), based on felony convictions for making criminal threats (§ 422), discharging a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3), and kidnapping (§ 207). Based on the same convictions he was also charged with two counts under section 12021.1(a), alleging gun possession by a person convicted of a

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reenacted as section 29900, subdivision (a)(1) without substantive change. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.) Because defendant was convicted under the repealed statutes, and they were only renumbered without substantive change, we refer to former sections 12021(a)(1) and 12021.1(a) throughout this opinion for clarity and convenience. For brevity, we will generally not use the word “former.”

2 specified violent offense (violent offender in possession).3 At trial defendant denied that he lived at the residence and claimed the two shotguns were not his. He stipulated that he previously was convicted of…

*734 Opinion

Here we are called upon to apply two related but distinct concepts: (1) the rule prohibiting multiple convictions based on greater and necessarily included offenses, and (2) Penal Code section 654’s prohibition against multiple punishment when “[a]n act . . . is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law . . . ,” 1 Defendant Maurice D. Sanders was convicted on two counts of possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1); hereafter section 12021(a)(1)), and two counts of possessing a firearm after conviction of a specified violent offense (former § 12021.1, subd. (a); hereafter section 12021.1(a)). 2 All four counts were based on his simultaneous possession of two firearms. We hold that neither section 12021.1(a) nor section 12021(a)(1) is a necessarily included offense of the other. Accordingly, under section 954, defendant was properly convicted of both offenses. Applying our recent decisions in Correa, supra, 54 Cal.4th 331 , and People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 [ 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 561 , 278 P.3d 821 ], we further hold that defendant may be separately punished for two violations of section 12021(a)(1) and of…

The doctrine of lesser included offenses is, at its core, a doctrine about legislative intent. It “is part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.” (People v. Smith (1950) 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 [ 224 P.2d 719 ]; see People v. Kehoe (1949) 33 Cal.2d 711, 713 [ 204 P.2d 321 ].) “[0]nce a conviction on the lesser offense has been obtained, ‘ “to . . . convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the lesser.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 306 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 , 914 P.2d 832 ].) Importantly, double jeopardy principles do not bar a legislature from authorizing multiple convictions and multiple punishments for necessarily included offenses. (Garrett v. United States (1985) 471 U.S. 773, 779 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 764 , 105 S.Ct. 2407 ]; Brown v. Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 165 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 187 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 ].) Instead, the rule against multiple convictions of necessarily included offenses is a judicially created doctrine premised on the notion that the legislature “ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’ they are construed not to…