Kasza

Kasza v. Whitman

Good Law
325 F.3d 1178·2003 WL 1870507
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApril 14, 2003Nos. 00-16378, 00-16379California1,492 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Rymer, J.

Opinion by Circuit Judge RYMER; Concurring opinion by Circuit Judge HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr.

OPINION

These appeals are from the district court’s refusal on remand to award attorney’s fees in Frost v. Rumsfeld, and from its order in both Frost and Kasza v. Whitman approving redaction of a previously sealed transcript before unsealing it. 1 The *1180 facts and our conclusion with respect to applicability of the state secrets privilege are set forth in Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.1998), and we do not repeat them. We affirm.

I

Frost argues that the district court erred in a number of respects by denying her request for attorney’s fees. However, since the district court’s original decision and our remand, the Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory upon which Frost’s application was predicated in Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 , 121 S.Ct. 1835 , 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). It held that there must be a judicial imprimatur which alters the parties’ legal relationship in order for a party to be a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees. We have subsequently held that Buckhannon’s rationale applies…

Concurring Opinion

Wood, J.

concurring.

While I recognize that the current posture of the case makes it impossible to reopen our original opinion, Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir.1998), I feel that I must write separately in this successive appeal. I strongly believe that the unusual nature of this case warrants special consideration, both by the court and by the government.

Our original decision was issued on January 8, 1998, back in the days of President Clinton. I concurred in that well written opinion without any reservations. In that opinion, we held that the state secrets privilege applied to bar discovery of the information sought by plaintiffs and that the scope of the privilege as asserted by the Air Force was not overbroad. Id. at 1169-70 . We recognized that, under the mosaic theory, even the existence or nonexistence of hazardous waste at the site was national security information. Id. Because discovery was denied, plaintiffs could not present a prima facie case, and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in each case was affirmed. However, the matter was remanded for further proceedings on several post-judgment rulings. Id. at 1174-75 . These post-judgment issues serve as the…

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