Anderson

Anderson v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n

Caution
2003 Daily Journal DAR 7943·336 F.3d 924·2003 WL 21665194·2003 A.M.C. 2849·84 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 41,454
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJuly 17, 2003No. 00-35457California10,651 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Fletcher, J.

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority commences with the statement that this is a cause of action in search of a defendant. I accept their assertion that there is a cause of action because I have found the defendant, and it is PMA.

The district court found appellants’ evidence of harassment sufficient to raise an inference that a hostile work environment existed on the waterfronts of Seattle and Tacoma, Washington, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994), and the Washington Law Against Discrimination, Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60 et seq. (2002). However, erroneously relying on the integrated enterprise test, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”) as to all claims, including hostile work environment. The majority acknowledges the district court’s error in relying on the integrated enterprise test but nonetheless affirms summary judgment in favor of PMA finding that the Sibley 1 rule is inapplicable to this case. The majority holding is simply wrong. To highlight the error in the majority’s analysis, I must start with a recital of the relevant facts omitted from the…

Lead Opinion

Tallman, J.

Opinion by Judge TALLMAN; Dissent by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER.

This case presents a cause of action in search of a defendant. The Plaintiffs, a group of longshoremen working on the docks in Seattle and Tacoma, allege that they were subject to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as ' well Washington’s Law Against Discrimination, Wash. Rev.Code § 49.60. 1 But the sole defendant left before us on appeal, Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”), is not the employer of any of the Plaintiffs. Rather, PMA ■ is a non-profit association of the stevedoring and shipping companies that do employ the Plaintiffs. *926 The district court granted summary judgment to PMA, holding that PMA could not be liable for discrimination because PMA was not the Plaintiffs’ employer. We agree and affirm.

I

A

The Plaintiffs are all African American. They allege that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment while employed on the waterfront in Seattle and Tacoma. For purposes of reviewing a summary judgment order, we assume these facts could be established in favor of the Plaintiffs. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623,…

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