The plaintiffs (collectively Verizon) appeal the judgment of the district court in favor of the defendants (collectively Co-vad). Federal question and diversity jurisdiction exist. The district court granted summary judgment to Covad, ruling that Verizon’s state law claims against Covad were barred by the filed rate doctrine governing the charges of regulated carriers. The district court further denied Verizon’s motion, filed after the judgment, to amend its complaint to sue on the basis of the filed tariffs.

We agree with the district court that the filed rate doctrine prevents the recovery of any charge not specified in the relevant tariff. We hold, however, that there is no barrier to Verizon suing to enforce what it has filed.

Covad cross-appeals the district court’s denials of its motions to strike Verizon’s original and first amended complaints. Covad also cross-appeals the dismissal of its counter-claims with prejudice. We affirm the denials of Covad’s motions to strike Verizon’s complaints but hold that summary judgment against Covad’s counterclaims was improper because Covad was not given adequate notice that the sufficiency of its claims would be at issue or an opportunity to respond.

*1083 FACTS

The several telephone companies here denominated “Verizon” are the corporate descendants of Bell Atlantic, a fusion of two former “baby Bell” telephone companies with another company. As an “incumbent local exchange” carrier or ILEC, Verizon is required to lease access to its network, “on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory,” to newer market entrants described as “competitive local exchange carriers” or CLECs. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, § 251 (c)(2)(D), 110 Stat. 56 , 62 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(2)(D)). Covad is such a competitor. As required by the Telecommunications Act, Verizon has entered into interconnection agreements (IAs) with Co-vad setting out the rates, terms and conditions. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(1). Each IA is lengthy and detailed; the IA governing service in Delaware, for example, is 78 pages long and incorporates more than 140 pages of schedules and appendices plus an 11-page amendment. As mandated by the Telecommunications Act, the IAs have been approved by the relevant State commissions in the jurisdictions in which Verizon and Covad operate and filed for public inspection and copying. See - 47 U.S.C. § 252 (e),(h).

We take from Verizon’s complaint its clear description of the technical side of the business:

As internet users know, problems arise with connections. Where Covad is leasing Verizon network elements, a Covad customer’s problem can arise from Covad or from Verizon equipment and infrastructure. Each filed IA stated that “Covad accepts responsibility for initial trouble isolation and providing [Verizon] with appropriate dispatch information based on its test results.” Each IA also provided:

Six of the nine IAs in the record further provided:

The remaining agreements provided:

Each agreement, as amended, contained a detailed schedule of fixed charges for trouble tickets erroneously requesting Verizon service. The Delaware IA, for example, authorized Verizon to charge Covad $44.63 if Covad erroneously requested a Verizon technician to examine a problem at one of Verizon’s Central Offices (dispatch in) and $116.74 if Covad erroneously requested a Verizon technician to examine a problem at a Covad customer’s location (dispatch out).

All but one of the agreements also incorporated a schedule governing Covad’s right to a “billing credit” from Verizon if Verizon’s service fell below performance standards. Trouble reports are factored into the performance metrics. The schedules also provided for an “adjustment of performance credit,” stating:

The facts in the following paragraphs are disputed. For the purposes of deciding this appeal from summary judgment, we assume that Verizon’s presentation, supported by affidavits, is true, leaving actual determination of the facts to such trial as may occur:

In the first quarter of 2000, Covad shirked its initial trouble-shooting responsibilities and issued numerous false trouble tickets leading Verizon to dispatch its technicians to solve problems arising from Covad’s service and equipment. Each erroneous trouble ticket included “a representation of fact” that “after conducting internal troubleshooting, Covad has determined that the trouble lies with Verizon rather than with Covad’s DSL service elements.” Covad resorted to such conduct because it was racing to meet its quarterly projections for growth in customer base and did not have adequately trained personnel to keep up the pace. Moreover, Covad directed its technicians to “close” new orders even if the DSL service was not working and to refer the resulting problems to Verizon via trouble tickets. Telling customers that trouble tickets to Verizon were issued, Covad deflected blame onto Verizon. Verizon incurred needless expense and lost the opportunity to use its resources more profitably. Finally, pursuant to what Verizon refers to as “Performance Assurance Plans” (“PAPs”) in effect in various states, which we take to mean the IAs’ provisions on poor performance, Verizon gave Covad millions of dollars in price reductions induced by Covad’s scheme.

PROCEEDINGS

Verizon filed this suit in the district court on June 11, 2001. The court dismissed Verizon’s original complaint with leave to amend for failure to state 'a claim upon which relief could be granted. On December 18, 2001, Verizon filed the operative first amended complaint, alleging California state law claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 . Covad sought dismissal of that pleading on several grounds, including the filed rate doctrine. The court denied Covad’s motion to dismiss, without prejudice to a motion for summary judgment based upon the filed fate doctrine. Covad then answered the first amended complaint and asserted three state law counterclaims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair competition. Covad sought summary judgment on Verizon’s claims based upon the filed rate doctrine. Verizon moved to dismiss Covad’s claims on a number of grounds.

On Verizon’s allegations, supported by affidavits, the district court gave this opinion (minor editorial changes have been made):

Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Communications Co., 232 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1070-72 (N.D.Cal.2002).

The district court also dismissed Covad’s counterclaims with prejudice based on a *1088 representation by Covad’s counsel that Co-vad would dismiss its counterclaims without prejudice if Covad prevailed on summary judgment. See id. at 1072-73 . In a post-judgment order, the district court clarified that its dismissal was a sua sponte entry of summary judgment in favor of Verizon.

Verizon appeals and Covad cross-appeals.

ANALYSIS

The filed rate doctrine is a tough and durable barrier to any effort by a regulated carrier to collect more for its services than what is set by the public, filed tariff. See Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 837 , 840-41 & n. 10 (9th Cir.2000); cf. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 420-24 , 106 S.Ct. 1922 , 90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (refusing to overrule the doctrine in the shipping context though “assum[ing]” it “was unwise as a matter of policy”). The doctrine, as Justice Stevens has vainly protested in dissent, was developed in a context different from modern markets. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 138, 138-39, 145-50 , 110 S.Ct. 2759 , 111 L.Ed.2d 94 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 586, 608 , 101 S.Ct. 2925 , 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It was a railroad-era contrivance, meant to curb monopolistic railroad companies like that portrayed in Frank Norris’s The Octopus. But the doctrine survived into the age of the Internet.

The filed rate doctrine passed from transportation law to communications law through the tariff-filing requirement in the Communications Act of 1934. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 221-22 , 118 S.Ct. 1956 , 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 , 1130-31, 1138-42 (9th Cir.2003). “Until the 1990’s, local phone service was thought to be a natural monopoly.” AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 , 119 S.Ct. 721 , 142 L.Ed.2d 835 (1999). Regulation was seen as the right recipe for monopoly.

The doctrine as applied to telecommunications was dealt a body blow by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Responding to the desires of the Federal Communications Commission and believers in the free market, Congress gave the FCC broad authority to “forbear” from regulation where the FCC determined that it was not necessary to assure just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory charges or otherwise to protect consumers and further determined that forbearance was “consistent with the public interest.” 47 U.S.C. § 160 (a). Armed with this authority, the FCC began a massive program of deregulation in favor of regulation by the market, supplemented by state-law remedies. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1132-1133. The radical shift in policy reflected a lack of concern that the purposes of the filed rate doctrine, as set out so clearly by the district court in this case, would go unfulfilled. The FCC noted “that in the absence of tariffs, consumers will be able to pursue remedies under state consumer protection and contract laws in a manner currently precluded by the ‘filed-rate’ doctrine.” Second Report & Order in the MATTER OF POLICY AND RULES CONCERNING THE INTERSTATE, INTEREXCHANGE MARKETPLACE, 11 F.C.C.R. 20,730, at ¶ 38, 1996 WL 633345 (1996); accord Order on Reconsideration in the MATTER OF POLICY AND RULES CONCERNING THE INTERSTATE, INTEREXCHANGE MARKETPLACE, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014, at ¶ 77, 1997 WL 473330 (1997). The notion that price discrimination is best avoided by enforcing the filed tariff was discarded for a large part of the telecom *1089 munications industry. The competence of regulatory agencies as superior to that of courts was no longer recognized as the norm.

Detariffing — to use a horrid neologism— was in. Contract and state consumer protection laws could rule “in a- detariffed environment.” Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,014 at ¶ 77. The Telecommunications Act had fundamentally restructured local telephone markets. See Iowa, Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371 , 119 S.Ct. 721 .

The new approach would be decisive in our case but for 47 U.S.C. § 160 (d): “the' Commission may not forbear from applying the requirements of section 251(c) or 271 of this title under subsection (a) of this section until it determines that those requirements have been fully implemented.” Section 251(c)(2)(D) provides that ILECs must provide interconnection “on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252 of this title.” Section 252 requires state regulators to approve interconnection agreements and file approved agreements for public inspection and copying. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (e), (h). Filed rates, terms, and conditions must be available to all. 47 U.S.C. § 252 (i). The IAs between Covad and Verizon were approved and filed pursuant to sections 251 and 252 and fall under the exception in section 160(d).

With the creation of the exception to forbearance and to the rule of contract, the market and state remedies, Congress preserved a niche where the filed rate doctrine appears to remain alive. The last phrase of the statutory exception — “until it determines that those requirements have been fully implemented” — is obscure. But we need not explore its meaning. No one contends that the FCC has made such a determination. Therefore, there is no forbearance. Cf. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 402 (7th Cir.2000). Apparently to assure the fair treatment of competitors by incumbents in a circumscribed field still needing correction of market imperfections, Congress and the FCC have left IAs to be ruled by tariffs.

Nonetheless, the filed rate doctrine now functions in the telecommunications field as an anomaly. It is a relic, open to repudiation by the FCC. The tariffs that are filed are not filed federally but with state agencies. Should not the law of the particular state govern each IA’s enforcement? It is tempting to believe that, in Congress’s new perspective, a suit for fraud of the kind before us should be allowed to proceed. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1591 , 1596, 1609-10, 1625-27, 1644 (2003).

The Supreme Court has declared that an exception for affirmative fraud has never been rejected by that court. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 583 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. 2925 . Still, as the district court observed, such an-exception has never been recognized. If a breach of this size is to be made in a filed tariff it is within the province of the Supreme Court to make it. Verizon cannot claim more for a fraudulent misdirect than the amount allowed by the tariff for any erroneous misdirect.

Verizon asserts that Covad’s conduct caused other losses whose recovery is not barred by the filed rate doctrine, including: (1) price reductions given Covad and other carriers because, thanks to the false trouble tickets, Verizon appeared to be liable under the PAPs for inferior performance; (2) shunning by customers who were led to believe that Verizon was giving *1090 faulty service; (3) foregone profit Verizon could have earned from the resources it employed in responding to the false trouble tickets. The second and third claims are not persuasive. To obtain from Covad damages for opportunity costs, resources drained and customers lost would put a price for each false trouble ticket higher than that set by the tariffs for erroneous tickets and so is banned by the filed tariff doctrine.

Verizon may, however, enforce schedules incorporated into the filed IAs governing reduction of' billing credits to Covad. To recoup overpayments is to enforce the filed rates. The filed rate doctrine “does not serve as a shield staving off claims ... based on the tariff itself.” Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs, 277 F.3d 1166 , 1171 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). So long as Verizon seeks repayment in accord with the criteria in the filed rates, Verizon has a viable claim. Verizon may not, however, collect from Covad overpayment to other customers because of performance metrics skewed by Covad’s alleged conduct because this charge would be in addition to the filed rate.

Verizon asked for injunctive relief in addition to damages. Specifically, Verizon notes that, by the terms of the IAs, “Covad accepts responsibility for initial trouble isolation and providing [Verizon] with appropriate dispatch information based on its test results.” To enjoin Covad to observe this undertaking would not be to subvert the filed tariff but to enforce it. Accordingly, Verizon is not precluded from seeking an injunction on this basis. See id. at 1171-72.; cf. Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46 , 58, 62-63 (2d Cir.1998).

In determining whether to issue an injunction, the district court may be required to determine the scope of the trouble-shooting obligations that Covad assumed when it agreed to the IA. This court has held that the filed-rate doctrine does not preclude judicial proceedings to interpret the provisions of a tariff or proceedings to enforce the tariff. Brown, 277 F.3d at 1171-72. Accordingly, interpretation of Covad’s obligations by the district court would be permissible under the filed-rate doctrine.

As the judgment of the district court must be vacated to permit Verizon to proceed with its case on the price concessions and enforcement of Covad’s obligations, the denial of Verizon’s motion to amend its complaint cannot be sustained on the ground that it came after judgment had been entered. As matters now stand, a motion to amend would come before trial on the merits of the two issues remanded. The normal rules permitting amendment should govern. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (providing that leave of the court to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (stating that Rule 15 “is to be applied with extreme liberality”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Covad’s Cross-Appeal

Covad’s motion to strike under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 125.16

Covad appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to strike Verizon’s first complaint pursuant to California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 . The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is “to allow early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation *1091 marks omitted). The anti-SLAPP statute specifies that it should be “construed broadly,” § 425.16(a), and allows a defendant to move to strike a plaintiffs complaint if the complaint stems “from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection, with a public issue.” § 425.16(b)(1). The statute, as potentially relevant here, applies to any “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” § 425.16(e)(4). But see § 425.17(c) (stating that § 425.16 does not apply to certain causes of action against businesses that make statements about the goods, services, or business operations of their competitors).

We have previously confirmed that defendants sued in federal courts can bring anti-SLAPP motions to strike state law claims and are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs when they prevail. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1109-10 ; United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir.1999). But we have also cautioned that “[procedural state laws are not used in federal court if to do so would result in a direct collision with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure” and have accordingly refused to apply certain discovery-limiting provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute because they would conflict with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832 , 845-46 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Covad contends that the district court erred by deferring consideration of Co-vad’s special motion to strike Verizon’s original complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute pending receipt of Verizon’s first amended complaint. Although the Vess court was not specifically considering the propriety of allowing a plaintiff to amend its complaint before ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the posture of, that case was similar to the present case: “All three defendants filed motions to strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute and for attorneys’ fees under that statute, Without ruling on the motions, the district court granted Vess leave to file a first amended complaint.” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1102 . The Vess court conducted its analysis of the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions with respect to Vess’s first amended complaint as opposed to Vess’s original complaint.

As Vess implicitly suggests, granting a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a plaintiffs initial complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend would directly collide with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)’s policy favoring liberal amendment. Covad argues that to accept the approach of Vess promotes forum shopping, encouraging plaintiffs to sue in federal courts rather than state courts because they would get “one free shot at a SLAPP suit before amending the complaint.” But a direct collision with a federal procedural rule exists. We do not need to proceed to the secondary test of “balancing the state interest in its procedural rule with the twin purposes of the Eñe doctrine, ‘discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’ ” Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 845 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 , 85 S.Ct. 1136 , 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)). Moreover, the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute, the early dismissal of meritless claims, would still be served if plaintiffs eliminated the offending claims from their original complaint. If the offending claims remain in the first amended complaint, the anti-SLAPP. remedies remain available to defendants.

*1092 Covad’s Rule 9(b) Motion

Verizon’s first amende'd complaint gave Covad adequate notice of the fraudulent conduct against which it had to defend. The complaint was not a fishing expedition for the “discovery of unknown wrongs” committed by Covad without “some factual basis” for the allegations made by Verizon. Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court properly denied Covad’s Rule 9(b) motion. Dismissal of Covad’s Counterclaims

The district court dismissed Covad’s counterclaims based on Covad’s representation that it would agree to dismissal of its counterclaims if it were to prevail on its motion for summary judgment against Verizon. Covad offered, however, to dismiss its counterclaims without prejudice. After Covad sought to amend the judgment to clarify that the dismissal was without prejudice, the district court changed course and indicated that although it “did base its dismissal of Covad’s counterclaims in part on Counsel’s offer of dismissal,” it had “in effect granted summary judgment sua sponte as to the counterclaims, and if the basis of the Court’s ruling as to Verizon’s claim were held to be erroneous or otherwise not applied to Verizon’s claims, there would be no basis to apply it to Covad’s counterclaims either.”

Before a court makes a sua sponte grant of summary judgment, “a litigant must be given reasonable notice that the sufficiency of his or her claim will be in issue.” Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742 (9th Cir.1993). When the court dismissed Covad’s counterclaims, Verizon had not yet responded to Covad’s counterclaims. Nothing in the record suggests that Covad had reasonable notice that the sufficiency of its counterclaims would be in issue. The district court erred by entering a sua sponte grant of summary judgment on Co-vad’s counterclaims. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Verizon on Covad’s counterclaims without prejudice to a subsequent motion for summary judgment once Covad has been afforded adequate notice that the sufficiency of its counterclaims will be at issue and has been given an opportunity to respond.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Covad on Verizon’s claims is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The judgment of the district court denying Covad’s motions to strike Verizon’s complaints is AFFIRMED; the judgment of the district court granting Verizon summary judgment on Covad’s counterclaims is REVERSED without prejudice to summary judgment after Co-vad is given adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. The case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.