Dukes

Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Bad Law
603 F.3d 571·2010 WL 1644259·109 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 15·76 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 928·93 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,872
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitApril 26, 2010Nos. 04-16688, 04-16720California43,126 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Kozinski, J.

dissenting:

Maybe there’d be no difference between 500 employees and 500,000 employees if they all had similar jobs, worked at the same half-billion square foot store and were supervised by the same managers. But the half-million members of the majority’s approved class held a multitude of jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed depending on each class member’s job, location and period of employment. Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.

I therefore join fully Judge Ikuta’s dissent.

Lead Opinion

Hawkins, J.

Opinion by Judge HAWKINS; Concurrence by Judge GRABER; Dissent by Judge IKUTA; Dissent by Chief Judge KOZINSKI.

Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart, Inc., discriminates against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After detailed briefing and hearing, the district court certified a class encompassing all women employed by Wal-Mart at any time after December 26, 1998, and encompassing all Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay, while creating a separate opt-out class encompassing the same employees for punitive damages. We affirm 1 the district court’s certification of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class of current employees with respect to their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay. With respect to the claims for punitive damages, we remand so that the district court may consider whether to certify the cláss under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). We also remand with respect to the claims of putative class members, who no longer worked for Wal-Mart when the complaint was filed so that the district court may consider whether to certify an additional class or classes under Rule…

Concurring Opinion

Graber, J.

concurring:

The majority and the dissent have written scholarly and complete explanations of them positions. What the length of their opinions may mask is the simplicity of the majority’s unremarkable holding:

If the employer had 500 female employees, I doubt that any of my colleagues would question the certification of such a class. Certification does not become an abuse of discretion merely because the class has 500,000 members.

I therefore concur fully in the majority opinion.

No court has ever certified a class like this one, until now. And with good reason. In this case, six women who have worked in thirteen of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores seek to represent every woman who has worked in those stores over the course of the last decade — a class estimated in 2001 to include more than 1.5 million women. According to the plaintiffs’ theory, Wal-Mart has a corporate policy of discrimination which it implements through the discretionary decisions of store managers, resulting in class-wide injury in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

But while the six plaintiffs allege they have suffered discrimination at the hands of a few individual store managers, they fail…

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