A.M. ex rel. Marshall v. Monrovia Unified School District

Good Law
627 F.3d 773
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitDecember 15, 2010Nos. 09-55169, 09-55478California4,785 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Goodwin, J.

*776 Opinion by Judge GOODWIN; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge BENNETT.

OPINION

A.M. and his parents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appeal a summary judgment for Monrovia Unified School District and West San Gabriel Special Education Local Planning Area (collectively, “Defendant”) on Plaintiffs’ action for violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 , and violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 . Plaintiffs also appeal an award of attorneys’ fees to Defendant under the IDEA. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.M. was a young boy, approximately eleven years old at all relevant times, with cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and global developmental delays. He was non-ambulatory and required assistance changing body positions. He had cortical blindness, meaning his eyes could see but his brain did not acknowledge what his eyes saw. Thus, A.M. did not always understand, retain, or make associations with what he saw. He could communicate only by responding to yes-or-no questions — a smile, a sound, or lifting…

Concurrence in Part

Bennett, J.

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Although I find that the majority’s decision is generally well reasoned, and I ultimately concur, albeit reluctantly, in the disposition of the Plaintiffs’ IDEA and Section 504 claims, I write separately to address my concern that the construction of the “transfer” statutes, California Education Code § 56325(a)(1) and 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(2)(C)(i), relied upon by the majority to determine which IEP the receiving district was required to implement, is contrary to both plain meaning and the purposes of these statutes. See Satterfield *783 v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir.2009) (“[O]ur inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”); The Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“[T]he structure and purpose of a statute may also provide guidance in determining the plain meaning of its provisions.”).

The majority agrees with the OAH’s conclusion that California Education Code § 56325(a)(1), which refers to a “previously approved” IEP, refers to “the last IEP that was actually implemented.” The majority finds persuasive the…

Sign in to read the full opinion

Create a free account to read the complete opinion text, citation history, and good-law status for this case.