Havelock

Opinion by Judge B. FLETCHER; Concurrence by Judge N.R. SMITH; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge REINHARDT; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge WARDLAW; Dissent by Judge FISHER.

OPINION

FLETCHER, B., delivered the opinion of the court, which is joined in full by Chief Judge KOZINSKI, Judge BERZON, Judge CALLAHAN, and Judge IKUTA. Parts I, II.A. and II.C. are joined by Judge SCHROEDER and Judge REINHARDT. Parts I, II.A. and II.B. are joined by Judge WARDLAW. Parts I and II.B. are joined by Judge FISHER and Judge N.R. SMITH. Chief Judge KOZINSKI and Judges SCHROEDER, B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, WARDLAW, BERZON, CALLAHAN, IKUTA, and N.R. SMITH join in the result:

“In matters of statutory construction ... it makes a great deal of difference whether you start with an answer or with a problem.” Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 , 529 (1947). We start with the problem presented by this case: the meaning of “person” and of “addressed to” in 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c) (“§ 876(c)”), which prohibits the mailing of communications “addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat…

concurring in the result:

I agree with the majority’s conclusion, but not with its analysis. The majority reads 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c) too narrowly when it concludes that § 876(c) refers exclusively to mailing threatening communications to natural persons. Section 876(c) also prohibits mailing threatening communications to corporations and other entities. I, therefore, do not join the majority’s analysis of the meaning of the term “person” in § 876(c). However, Havelock’s convictions should be reversed, because the government did not present any evidence that Havelock had a specific intent to threaten when he mailed the “media packets.”

I

In this case, we are called upon to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c). “In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 , 108 S.Ct. 1811 , 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). Thus, to determine the meaning of “person” in § 876(c), we must examine both § 876(c) and the language and design of § 876 as a whole. 18 U.S.C. § 876 states:

A

“Statutory interpretation must begin with the…

concurring in part and dissenting in part. Part I is joined by Judge WARDLAW and Judge BERZON. Part II is joined by Judge SCHROEDER:

Writing and mailing off to the media a largely incomprehensible diatribe with *1304 vague allusions to evil acts that the author intended to have accomplished by the time his Manifesto was received was the unwise act of a troubled mind. It was not, however, criminal behavior that satisfies either of the two elements required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c). I concur with the majority’s reversal of Havelock’s criminal conviction and with its holding that a communication must be addressed to a natural person. Unfortunately, the majority’s subsequent discussion, which concludes that the identity of the addressee can be discovered anywhere within the body of the document, renders irrelevant the holding on which its decision is based, and totally eliminates one of the two essential elements required by the statute.

The statutory text clearly sets forth two elements. Specifically, it requires that 1) the communication be addressed to a person, and 2) the communication contain a threat to a person. By permitting courts to look to the entire…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The district court denied Havelock’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal, which incorporated the statutory and constitutional arguments underlying his earlier motion to dismiss the indictment. The district court first ruled that to violate 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c), the communication must be addressed to a natural person; but to decide that question, the finder of fact may look to the contents of the communication. Second, the district court found that Havelock’s communications were addressed to the public, a group of natural persons. Third, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a “true threat” under Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 , 123 S.Ct. 1536 , 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), to sustain Havelock’s conviction. The panel majority reverses the district court on the ground that Havelock’s threat was not addressed to natural persons.

I agree with the panel majority that to violate § 876(c) the defendant must address the communication to a natural person, and that the finder of fact may look to the content of the communication. However, I conclude that Havelock’s communications were addressed to natural persons, as the district court found, but…

with whom

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority that we may look to the contents of a communication to determine to whom it is addressed, I disagree with the majority that Havelock’s communications were not “addressed to any other person.” 18 U.S.C. § 876 (c).

As an initial matter, I have some doubts regarding the majority’s conclusion that § 876(c) applies only to communications addressed to natural persons. Although there is some reason to reach that conclusion, the context in which the phrase “addressed to any other person” appears, the purpose of § 876 and the importance of construing federal statutes to avoid absurd results suggest that § 876(c) may apply to communications addressed both to natural persons and, as relevant here, to corporations.

I need not resolve that question, however, because even assuming § 876(c) applies only to communications addressed to natural persons, as the majority holds, I would hold that Havelock’s communications were so addressed. Havelock mailed his manifesto to media outlets such as the New York Times, presumably for publication. Although neither the manifesto nor the threats it contains were directed at any specific…