In re Coley

California’s “Three Strikes” law applies to a criminal defendant who is currently charged and convicted of a felony and who has previously been convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies. One aspect of the law that has proven controversial is that the lengthy punishment prescribed by the law may be imposed not only when such a defendant is convicted of another serious or violent felony but also when he or she is convicted of any offense that is categorized under California law as a felony. This is so even when the current, so-called triggering, offense is nonviolent and may be widely perceived as relatively minor. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Carmony (2004) 33 *529 Cal.4th 367, 381 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 880 , 92 P.3d 369 ] (conc. opn. of Moreno, J., joined by Chin, J.) (Carmony I); Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism California’s Best Hope? (2004) 37 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1025, 1026 [“Widely reported Three Strikes cases have involved trivial offenses—such as the theft of a bicycle, a slice of pizza, cookies or a bottle of vitamins—that have resulted in severe sentences.”].)

Shortly after…

I concur in the majority opinion except for its response to petitioner’s belated claim under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ], which petitioner in my view has forfeited by failing to raise it below. I share Justice Liu’s concern that the majority opinion, in choosing to address Apprendi’s application to petitioner’s sentence, does not fully respond to petitioner’s argument. (See cone. opn. of Liu, J,, post.)

I join the opinion of the court except for its treatment of petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ] (Apprendi) and related precedent, constrains our consideration of the circumstances of his triggering offense. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 556-559.) As explained below, I would not decide the merits of petitioner’s claim and instead would deem it forfeited.

*563 Petitioner was charged with two felony offenses: failure to register as a sex offender upon arrival in a jurisdiction and failure to update his sex offender registration within five working days of his birthday. The jury acquitted petitioner of the former offense and convicted him of the latter. Before the sentencing hearing, petitioner asked the trial court to strike at least two of his three prior felony convictions. He relied on the assertedly minor and nonaggravated nature of his conviction for failing to update his registration and argued that, in his case, a 25-year-to-life sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In denying this request, the…

Filed 8/30/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

In re WILLIE CLIFFORD COLEY ) S185303 ) on Habeas Corpus. ) Ct. App. 2/5 No. B224400 ____________________________________)

California‘s ―Three Strikes‖ law applies to a criminal defendant who is currently charged and convicted of a felony and who has previously been convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies. One aspect of the law that has proven controversial is that the lengthy punishment prescribed by the law may be imposed not only when such a defendant is convicted of another serious or violent felony but also when he or she is convicted of any offense that is categorized under California law as a felony. This is so even when the current, so- called triggering, offense is nonviolent and may be widely perceived as relatively minor. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 381 (conc. opn. of Moreno, J., joined by Chin, J.) (Carmony I); Vitiello, California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism California’s Best Hope? (2004) 37 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 1025, 1026 [―Widely reported Three…