Aranda

People v. Aranda

Good Law
145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 855·2012 Cal. LEXIS 8223·55 Cal. 4th 342·2012 WL 3641511·283 P.3d 632
Supreme Court of CaliforniaAugust 27, 2012S188204California41,522 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Cantil-Sakauye, J.

It is a fundamental precept of our criminal justice system that before a jury may convict a defendant of a criminal offense, it must find that the prosecution has proved all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State law and the federal Constitution require the trial court to instruct with regard to this fundamental principle when it advises the jurors of the applicable rules of law that govern their deliberation and decision. In California, a trial court ordinarily satisfies this obligation by instructing the jury under one of two “pattern” or “standard” reasonable doubt instructions. (See CALCRIM No. 220; CALJIC No. 2.90; hereafter sometimes referred to as the standard reasonable doubt instruction.)

In the present case, defendant was charged with two separate crimes: murder and participation in a criminal street gang (hereafter sometimes referred to as the gang offense). After the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, when the trial court instructed the jurors on the applicable legal principles immediately prior to their deliberations, the court inadvertently failed to include the standard reasonable doubt instruction. With…

Concurrence in Part

Liu, J.

A fundamental tenet of our criminal law is that “the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction *378 except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 368 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 ].) Accordingly, the jury verdict required under the Sixth Amendment to convict a person of a criminal offense “is a jury verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ] (Sullivan).) The trial court has a constitutional duty to so instruct the jury. (Id. at p. 281.)

The trial court in this case failed to give a standard reasonable doubt instruction that would have apprised the jury that “[a] defendant in a criminal action is presumed' to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the People the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (CALJIC No. 2.90; see CALCRIM No. 220.) I agree with today’s opinion that despite this omission, the…

Concurrence in Part

Kennard, J.

Defendant was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187) and actively participating in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a) (the gang offense)). At trial, the court failed to give the jury the standard instruction on the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter (a lesser offense necessarily included in the charge of murder), and of the gang offense.

With regard to the voluntary manslaughter conviction, the majority concludes that the absence of a reasonable doubt instruction did not violate defendant’s right to due process under either the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The majority explains that other instructions pertaining to the murder charge made it clear that the jury had to apply the concept of reasonable doubt. I agree.

With respect to the conviction for the gang offense, the majority holds that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt violated defendant’s federal due process rights because, unlike the murder charge, no other instructions told the jury to apply the standard of reasonable doubt to the gang offense. I…

Opinion

Filed 8/27/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) ) S188204 v. ) ) Ct.App. 4/1 D055701

ANTHONY ARANDA, JR., )

) Riverside County Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. SWF010404 ____________________________________)

It is a fundamental precept of our criminal justice system that before a jury may convict a defendant of a criminal offense, it must find that the prosecution has proved all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State law and the federal Constitution require the trial court to instruct with regard to this fundamental principle when it advises the jurors of the applicable rules of law that govern their deliberation and decision. In California, a trial court ordinarily satisfies this obligation by instructing the jury under one of two ―pattern‖ or ―standard‖ reasonable doubt instructions. (See CALCRIM No. 220, CALJIC No. 2.90, hereafter sometimes referred to as the standard reasonable doubt instruction.) In the present case, defendant was charged…

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