Concurring in small part and Disagreeing in large part:

Mrs. George has been through a painful set of circumstances, and she deserves not to be subjected to these facts again and again. Nevertheless, with the advice of counsel, she has chosen to sue the deputies who responded to her emergency call, and they, too, are entitled to fair and proper treatment under the law. To render these deputies subject to this misguided lawsuit misapprehends the hazardous situation in which they found themselves, and it devalues case law on the dangers of domestic disputes such as the failed physical attempt by Mrs. George to disarm her angry and dangerous husband.

Moreover, the majority opinion misper-ceives an important aspect of the doctrine of qualified immunity as explained by the Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), an aspect since embraced by the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits — not to mention our own. The Court’s holding in Scott v. Harris and the principle upon which it rests ensures that government officials will not be required to defend themselves in court if it appears to an appellate court from the record taken as a whole that the plaintiff has no case, and therefore as a matter “of law,” id. at 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis added), the lawsuit cannot survive summary judgment. Thus, the majority opinion inadvertently dilutes an essential public interest the doctrine protects: the ability of government officials to perform their responsibilities without paralyzing fear of inappropriate personal lawsuits and potential civil liability.

Let’s make one thing clear. The outcome of the rapidly evolving events on March 6, 2008, was not a success. Why? Because Mr. George died, and the best result of interventions like this is to resolve them with no loss of life or other injury. No reasonable law enforcement agency or deputy could disagree with this assessment. On the other hand, fortunately neither the first responders nor anyone else was harmed.

*841 I

With all respect to my colleagues, I disagree with their and the district court’s conclusion that Mr. George did not pose an immediate threat “to the safety of the officers” called to the scene by his distraught and terrified wife in a 9-1-1 emergency call, or an immediate threat to the safety “of others.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir.2010). This factor is central to this case because, in the calculus of whether or not the force used by police to respond to a hazardous tactical situation was unreasonable and excessive, it is the “most important.” Id. We must get this right before we go any further. 1

II

I begin with undisputed facts.

This tragic series of events began at 7:44 a.m. on Thursday, March 6, 2008, when Mrs. George, the decedent’s wife, placed a 9-1-1 emergency call which was received by the Ventura Branch of the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”). A recording of the call indicates that Mrs. George was hysterically screaming, indeed shrieking almost incomprehensively as loud as any human being could. Repeatedly she is heard amidst the background din of the call yelling, not “exclaiming” but yelling, at the top of her lungs. She says, “No, No, No” and “My husband has a gun!” The 911 operator attempts unsuccessfully to calm her down. A male voice — most certainly her husband’s — can be heard in the background saying, “nothing,” to which she says “okay.” A moment of calm during which she said she was in Santa Barbara is interrupted by more sudden blood curdling screaming and shrieking, “No, No, No, Stop it.”, and the phone on Mrs. George’s end went dead. This is indisputable evidence that a serious domestic dispute was in progress, a heated quarrel between a desperate wife and a defiant husband over a firearm.

The Ventura CHP dispatch operator then immediately called Santa Barbara Sheriffs emergency and advised that dispatch operator of Mrs. George’s call. Santa Barbara was told that Ventura CHP had received a call from a woman in Santa Barbara “screaming that her husband has a.gun.” Ventura CHP also advised that the operator was unable to get a complete address. Santa Barbara said, “Okay we’ll give her a call.”

The following conversation then occurred between the CHP 9-1-1 dispatcher and the Santa Barbara 9-1-1 dispatcher: ' '

The Santa Barbara dispatcher operator then called Mrs. George. Throughout this *842 call, Mrs. George is breathing very heavily and periodically talking to a man in the background, presumably her husband. She is anything but calm and collected. The dispatcher described her as sounding “scared.”

At this point, the dispatcher indicated in her deposition that she thought Mr. George had hung up the phone. The dispatcher called back:

At 7:51 a.m., Sheriffs deputies were sent to the location, arriving at 7:56 a.m., just 12 minutes after Mrs. George’s first 9-1-1 call. They had been advised by dispatch (1) of a domestic violence incident in progress (“415 D”), (2) that a firearm was involved, (3) that Mr. George had hung up the phone during the 9-1-1 calls, (4) that Mr. George had cancer, (5) that Mr. George was the person with the firearm, and (6) that he had registered firearms in his residence. This constellation of facts and circumstances amounted to “probable cause to believe that [Mr. George] pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officers or others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). For all the deputies knew, Mrs. George herself was in harms way.

Here, I elaborate on what went on in the George household immediately before the first 9-1-1 call. These facts come from Mrs. George’s own words recorded by the Sheriffs Department roughly only four hours after the incident, i.e., “Carol’s version.” Maj. Op. at 832, n. 1. After his brain surgery, Mr. George became an angry man.

(Emphasis added).

When questioned about her knowledge that the gun was loaded, Mrs. George said, “Yeah, he had stuck a pin in it, I saw him do that.” (Emphasis added). When asked what she meant by “pin,” she said, “That clip, something ... yeah, I saw him do that because it wasn’t loaded in the car, and I saw him pull it out from a different place and he stuck it in, and I said ‘just give it to me, no.’ And I started trying to pull him, pretty strong, I couldn’t do it.” (Emphasis added). When Mr. George’s gun was recovered, it was loaded with hollow-point bullets.

Parenthetically, Mrs. George’s attorney now claims that Mr. George was so impaired by his condition that he was not physically able to point his gun at Deputy Rogers. During oral argument, counsel said, “In particular, Deputy Rogers says that [Mr. George] lifted it up standing with two hands standing and pointing it at him. Mrs. George’s statement was that he was physically incapable of doing that at that time.... The manner in which he was pointing at the officer being directly contradicted by what his wife....” These factual assertions and claims by counsel are irreconcilable with Mrs. George’s detailed description just four hours after the shooting of her husband’s behavior that morning. He was ambulatory, obdurate, “pretty strong” enough to resist his wife’s “yanking” attempt to stop him, threatening to use his gun, and dexterous enough to load a clip into an automatic pistol — an action that takes two hands to accomplish. Moreover,' she was not a witness to the shooting. Months later, now in litigation, and even though she saw her husband load a clip into his firearm on the morning of the shooting, she declares “under penalty of perjury” that he “was unable to stand on his own without holding his walker and hold a gun with both hands in front of him.” It will be quite interesting on cross-examination when she is asked to demonstrate for the jury how her husband loaded the clip into his gun. This situation is a close cousin to our “sham affidavit” rule that a “party cannot create an issue of fact *844 by an affidavit contradicting ... prior deposition testimony.” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.1991). As we said in Kennedy , “if a party who has been examined at length on deposition could raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact.” Id. (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted). After Scott v. Harris, this common sense rule takes on added significance.

In addition, we have the testimony of Mr. George’s friend, Lawrence Kaehn. Mr. Kaehn, a cancer survivor, and Mr. George frequently discussed Mr. Kaehn’s cancer treatment. On one occasion before Mr. George fell ill, he said, “Well, I know what I would do if I came down with cancer. I would get a gun, call the sheriff and have them shoot me.” Mr. Kaehn, having considered becoming a sheriff at one time, was “appalled.” He said, “It wouldn’t be very fair to the sheriff.” Mr. George then “gazed off,” “stared for a while,” and changed the subject. Unfortunately, “suicide by cop” is a well-documented, terrible phenomenon always present when law enforcement responds to a “man with a gun” call.

On top of all of this, Mrs. George’s cry for help was accurately conveyed by the dispatcher to the deputies as one involving armed domestic violence. That is what the deputies were told, and, according to Mrs. George’s own words, that is what it was. I repeat, he had threatened to use the gun and struggled physically with his wife over its possession. These 9-1-1 calls are a textbook case of what local law enforcement confronts when receiving such a 9-1-1 request for help. In this respect, “we must view the facts [from the deputies’] perspective at the time [they] decided to fire.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir.2010).

In Mottos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc), in connection with our discussion of the appropriateness of force in that case, we had much to say about what law enforcement faces when it responds to a 9-1-1 domestic dispute call. We did so in consideration of “the additional ‘specific factors’ relevant to the totality of [the relevant] circumstances.” Id. at 450 (quoting Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 ). We said,

Mottos, 661 F.3d at 450 (emphasis added).

Ill

Against this grim backdrop, the majority says, as did the district court, that when he was on the balcony (1) Mr. George had not committed a crime, (2) he was not actually resisting arrest or trying to flee, (3) the domestic disturbance was over, and (4) thus, Mr. George did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or to others that would have justified the use of force. With all respect, to portray this incident in this fashion is to expose the *845 irrelevance of the “missing factors” to these events and a misunderstanding of domestic disputes, especially those involving firearms. 2 If the majority . opinion’s inert view of the events at the George residence is correct, should the officers have simply left the scene? After all, Mr. George had not committed a crime, his wife was supposedly safe, he was not resisting arrest or attempting to flee, and he was entitled by the Second Amendment to have a loaded gun on his own property. This reasoning is illogical, as is George’s purported expert’s, Thomas Parker, statement in his declaration that the deputies “apparently did not take into account the fact that under California law, it is no crime to keep or carry a firearm in one’s own home or on one’s property as long as it is not fired and no one is threatened.” In elaboration on this irrelevancy, Parker, instead of discussing the actual incident, said,

Mr. Parker appears in his sanitized version of these events not to be familiar with California Penal Code Section 246.3 which makes it a crime for any person willfully to discharge a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person. People v. Leslie, 47 Cal.App.4th 198 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 (1996) describes this crime as a “serious felony.” Section 417 of the Penal Code makes it a crime to draw or to exhibit a firearm in a threatening manner. Finally, the City of Santa Barbara Municipal Code (S.B.M.C.) makes it unlawful to discharge any firearm of any description in that city. S.B.M.C. Ch. 9.34.020. To the extent that the abstract legal landscape of this incident is minimally material, these are the laws that applied to Mr. George’s actual and intended behavior that morning.

More about Parker and his declarations later.

Mr. George had terminal brain cancer and was clearly suicidal. He had armed himself with a loaded gun, he was not thinking clearly, he was threatening to use it; and his wife, who had tried unsuccessfully to disarm him, was terrified. She did not call Mr. George’s doctor, his pastor, her neighbor, or his friend Mr. Kaehn— *846 she called law enforcement. She knew what a dangerous situation she had on her hands, as we plainly did in Mottos , but we waive it off as not dangerous? Minutes later, a residential neighborhood was the scene of gunfire and a dead body. This situation could not be “safe" for anyone until Mr. George no longer had a loaded gun. Mrs. George certainly understood this, even though Mr. Parker does not. So do the friends and families of officers killed or injured responding to this category of 9-1-1 calls. Contrary to my colleagues’ view, this dispute was not “seemingly over” when the deputies arrived; and she was clearly still in jeopardy with an armed, suicidal, defiant, and angry husband in the house.

Like the Eleventh Circuit in Harris v. Coweta County, my colleagues place undue emphasis on the absence of the circumstances specifically identified in Graham, even though we have clearly labeled them non-exhaustive: “These factors, however, are not exclusive. Rather, we examine the totality of the circumstances and consider ‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed in Graham.’ ” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir.1994)). We must understand this situation for what it was, not for what it was not. A plaintiffs “sanitized version of the incident cannot control on summary judgment when the record as a whole does not support that version.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 551 . I suppose pursuant to the irrelevant and immaterial idea in the abstract that Mr. George’s possession of the gun was lawful and that he had not committed a crime, we could say the same about John Hinkley before he shot President Reagan, Jared Loughner before he gunned down United States District Judge John Roll and United States Representative Gabrielle Gif-fords, Adam Lanza before the Sandy Hook massacre, and James Holmes before the Aurora Colorado slaughter. Mr. George certainly wasn’t in their category, but armed people who are combative, furious, angry, and mentally unstable — whatever the reason — are dangerous, period. When we send law enforcement out to cope with them, it is wrong to proclaim that the personnel doing so are not in danger. And, as the United States Supreme Court said in Graham, we must consider that these deputies were responding and reacting to “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation requiring them to make split second decisions involving — in this case— life and death. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Bryan, 630 F.3d at 818 (Tallman dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). Mrs. George tried unsuccessfully to disarm her husband. What might have happened had she tried again? Moreover, once Mr. George started firing his weapon outside his home, no telling where the bullets might have gone. I note with some irony that we continue to search nationally for ways to keep firearms out of the hands of mentally unstable persons.

Regrettably, our federal courts have had extensive experience with domestic disputes involving angry and quarreling spouses, and we have written many opinions on this subject — including Mattos v. Agarano — on which law enforcement personnel are entitled to rely. Here is an example of what we have said.

1. United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir.2005) (emphasis supplied).

2. United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir.2004).

3. Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 198 (2nd Cir.1998) (emphasis added).

4. Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 50-51 (1st Cir.1999).

5. Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 52 (1st Cir.1999).

IV

I turn to what is the core issue in this case: What happened at the rear of the George residence during the time Mr. George walked out into the open on his patio and the fatal shot fired by Deputy Rogers? Did they gun down a sick man who did not even know they were there? Or, did they fire only when he pointed a gun at one of them? Scott v. Harris requires that we examine what the evidence shows, not raw speculation and guesswork, but the evidence. Has Mrs. George tendered a case sufficient to survive summary judgment or to support a verdict in her favor? Or, does her case fail before trial as a matter of law for want of evidence?

A.

Before I tackle this question, however, let’s put in proper analytical focus the “facts” we must view in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Here, notwithstanding my colleagues belief to the contrary, the Supreme Court has told us that we are not automatically bound on interlocutory appeal by a district court’s statement that a genuine dispute of material facts exists such as to require a trial. In Scott v. Harris, the Court said,

550 U.S. at 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)) (footnote & alteration omitted) (emphasis added).

The Court continued:

Id. (internal quotation marks & citations omitted) (emphasis in original). In its opinion, the Court once again noted the importance of resolving qualified immunity issues as soon as possible, because “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. at 376 n. 2, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (internal quotation mark omitted). In Scott v. Harris, the Court looked at the “record taken as a whole,” id. at 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , and it overrode the district court’s and the Eleventh Circuit’s explicit conclusions that a genuine dispute of material facts precluded the denial of summary judgment for the defendant officers. Id. at 380-81 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 . The Eleventh Circuit said, “We reject the defendant’s argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.” Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d at 815. The Court dismissed Justice Stevens’s dissenting view that the issue of unreasonable and therefore excessive force was “best reserved for a jury,” and that *849 the Court was “usurping the jury’s fact-finding function.” In answer to his concerns, the Court said,

Id. at 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

Three years after Scott v. Harris, we followed this jurisdictional and legal guidance in Wilkinson where we looked past the district court’s conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate because of the perceived existence of “disputed issues of material facts.” Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 548 .

B.

Some observations about my colleagues concerns arising from their understanding of Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 , 115 S.Ct. 2151 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). In this respect, Judge O’Scannlain writes, “Any decision by the district court ‘that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically unre-viewable .on interlocutory appeal.’” Maj. Op. at p. 834 (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2009)) (emphasis added). This categorical understanding might have been correct before Scott v. Harris, but it is no longer.

First, the Court decided Johnson in 1995, Scott v. Harris in 2007. In deciding Scott v. Harris, the Court no doubt was aware of Johnson , but my colleagues are correct, it was not mentioned. Thus, I read the two cases not as in conflict, as the Supreme Court surely understood, but plainly compatible. Noting clearly that Jones did offer sufficient information to support a verdict in his favor, 505 U.S. at 307-08, 112 S.Ct. 2482 , Johnson held that we will not on interlocutory appeal revisit that issue, id. at 313 , 112 S.Ct. 2482 . Scott v. Harris, on the other hand simply says, but if after examining the “record as a whole” it becomes clear to an appellate court that the plaintiff has no case sufficient to survive Rule 50(c), the unique preemptive purpose of qualified immunity prevails, and the case shall be dismissed now, not later. 550 U.S. at 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 . I repeat what the Court said in Scott v. Harris about the plaintiffs alleged facts: they must be “supportable by the record.” 550 U.S. at 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis omitted). In our case, the complaint’s allegations find no factual support in the record: Accordingly, as defined by Scott v. Harris, the record taken as a whole issue "is a quintessential issue of law, not just of disputed facts.

I do not stand alone in my understanding of Scott v. Harris. To begin with, we have the Wilkinson opinion in our own circuit. Furthermore, other circuits have weighed in on this issue. The Third Circuit described Scott as marking “the outer limit of the principle of Johnson v. Jones— where the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals, may say so, even on interlocutory review.” Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3rd Cir.2007). The Sixth and Tenth Circuits view Scott as an exception to Johnson’s, jurisdictional limitation. In Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir.2009), the Sixth Circuit described Scott v. Harris as recognizing “an apparent éxception to [John son’s] jurisdictional limitation when its considered and rejected a district court’s denial of summary judgment even though the district court had found genuine issues existed as-to material facts.’’ Id. at. 370. The. court then said, “In trying to reconcile *850 Scott with the Supreme Court’s edict in Johnson , this [c]ourt has concluded that where ‘the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory appeal.’” Id. (quoting Blaylock, supra); Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (10th Cir.2010) (“[W]hen the ‘version of events’ the district court holds a reasonable jury could credit ‘is blatantly contradicted by the record,’ we may assess the case based on our own de novo view of which facts a reasonable jury could accept as true.” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 )). Both circuits have relied on their understanding of Scott v. Harris in thorough, unpublished opinions. Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 439 Fed.Appx. 433, 456-57 (6th Cir.2011); Blackwell v. Strain, 496 Fed.Appx. 836, 845-47 (10th Cir.2012). In each ease, the circuits granted qualified immunity to the defendants on appeal notwithstanding the district courts’ statements regarding the existence of genuine disputes of material fact.

The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits view Scott as simply “reinforc[ing] the unremarkable principle that at the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in a light most favorable the non-moving party when there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 277 (4th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir.2010) (“Although we view the facts and any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], we cannot ignore evidence which clearly contradicts [the plaintiffs] allegations.” (citation omitted)); Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2013) (recognizing that a circuit court may “discard[ ] a party’s account when the account is inherently incredible and could not support reasonable inferences sufficient to create an issue of fact,” but holding that the defendants evidence did not completely discredit the plaintiffs version of events (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore, Scott v. Harris’s rule does not apply only to situations where a videotape demolishes a plaintiffs case. Although some of the cases I refer to did benefit from a videotape, Scott v. Harris clearly did not create a videotape-specific rule. Instead, it established a principle to be applied where it is applicable. The whole record there made that principle applicable as a matter of law, as I believe it does here — as a matter of law. The Court referred to the videotape as “an added wrinkle,” not as a prerequisite to the application of the articulated principle. 550 U.S. at 378 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 . Wilkinson did not rely on a videotape either, but we followed Scott v. Harris nevertheless. 610 F.3d at 549-51 .

In summary, Johnson remains viable, but only where the case involves a genuine issue of material fact, not when it does not.

C.

I return to the case at hand. Noting that not a single percipient witness contradicts this evidence, I start with Deputy Rogers’s description of this event:

Deputy Rogers’s first-person description of his use of a firearm is corroborated by Deputy Schmidt: . ■

Next, I turn to Deputy Morris:

Lawrence Hess was Schmidt’s, Rogers’s, and Morris’s supervisor. He heard the initial dispatch call to the George residence and arrived shortly after his deputies. This is his input:

In addition to the deputies’ declarations, we have bystander citizen information *853 from Karla MacDuff corroborating their description of the sequence of events and the deputies’ warnings before the shooting started. MacDuff was a guest and a friend of the Georges who was living in the lower apartment level of the house. According to MacDuff, she was awakened at approximately 7:45 a.m. that morning by someone excitedly shouting “Drop the gun.” She heard this command two times. After these commands, then she heard “quite a few gunshots.” There is nothing relevant in the record that challenges her information.

The unchallenged department log of real-time radio broadcasts from the deputies in the field reveal how quickly these events unfolded. At 8:04:22 a.m. (Deputy Schmidt), the log reports “... no visual on the subject.” At 8:08:04 a.m. (Deputy Morris), “Subj on the second floor to the rear of residence just opened the door to balcony (sic) no vosual (sic).” 8:11:51 a.m. (Deputy Schmidt), “Subj with a firearm in left hand.” Twelve seconds later, at 8:12:03 a.m. (Deputy Schmidt), “Shots fired.” Thirteen seconds later at 8:12:16 a.m. (Deputy Rogers), “Subj down.” These radio broadcasts and this timeline corroborate the deputies’ version of the events. The elapsed time from Mr. George’s appearance on the balcony to “shots fired” was a mere twelve seconds. Twelve seconds is roughly fifteen normal heartbeats. That is how precipitously this encounter transpired.

Finally, Deputy Rogers’s shot that hit Mr. George entered into the front of his body and emerged through the rear. This evidence indicates that Mr. George had turned to face Deputy Rogers — who was stationed to the left side of Mr. George when he walked onto the patio. I note that the photographs in the record are consistent with the deputies’ descriptions of their locations at the time of the shooting.

Was Mr. George suicidal? Was he planning that morning to use his gun? Mrs. George thought so. Pam Plesons,. her friend and neighbor, recounts this conversation with her on the morning immediately after the shooting:

V

Against the combined force of this compelling evidence, the district court concluded nevertheless that the defendant’s motion must fail. On what did the district court rely? (1) A textbook example of a self-serving declaration from Mr. George’s wife who did not see the shooting, a declaration prepared during litigation which is impeached by her own words, (2) disputed facts that are not material, and (3) a demonstrably flawed report from an ex-FBI Agent full of irrelevant inadmissible speculation.

The fatal problems with Mrs. George’s manufactured declaration have been discussed in Part II of this opinion. Thus, let’s examine the district court’s “disputed facts.”

Here the court cited to differences between the deputies’ memories as to who “made the decision to set up a perimeter around the house.” Remembering that this entire event took only a few minutes and that it was fluid and rapidly evolving, who set up the perimeter is utterly immaterial. No one disputes that the deputies set up a perimeter. Who gave the order is of no moment. Moreover, the record and the deputies’ declarations previously quoted reveal that two perimeters were established, the first when Morris and Rogers arrived, and the second when Schmidt arrived, saw Mr. George emerge on the patio, and the deputies then moved and surrounded the rear of the house. I repeat, the perimeter changed when Mr. George appeared on the patio.

The next “disputed fact” seized upon by the district court was who saw Mr. George first and how he was holding the gun. Again, the deputies were not together, and who saw him first and how he was holding the gun is inconsequential. To quote the district court, “Deputy Morris stated that it was Deputy Schmidt who first made contact with Mr. George. However, Deputy Schmidt stated that Deputy Morris was the first one to see Mr. George.” Under these kaleidoscopic circumstances, who saw Mr. George first is immaterial to the question of whether the deputies’ use of force was reasonable or excessive. So is how he was holding the gun when he emerged on the patio. Everyone, everyone agrees he was carrying a loaded gun in his hands.

In summary, these “disputed facts” add nothing to the plaintiffs case. To give them probative weight violates a central principle of summary judgment law: “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Next, we get to whether Mr. George provoked the shooting because instead of dropping his gun as commanded, he pointed it at Deputy Rogers. Here, the district court relied on an opinion, purported to be an expert opinion, offered after the fact by Thomas Parker. Parker says he did not believe Deputy Schmidt could see Mr. George and therefore Deputy Schmidt could not tell whether or not Mr. George had a gun. Again, Mr. George did have a gun, and second, it is news to me that a witness can testify as an expert that from point A, he doesn’t believe someone can be fully seen from point B. This isn’t “expert testimony.” And here, it is no more than rank and inadmissible result-oriented speculation. Did Parker simply disregard *855 Karla McDufFs statements that she heard the deputies shouting “drop the gun!”?

Mr. Parker’s opinion on the key issue of whether Mr. George pointed his gun in Deputy Roger’s direction is no better. Parker’s report makes no mention of the violent struggle the Georges had over the gun before the deputies arrived. Parker incompletely describes Mr. George as handicapped with a right side and arm that were “extremely weak.”

Moreover, Parker claims a special ability to read body language and to divine who is “lying” and who is not. He claims by virtue of his education, training, knowledge, and experience that he is aware of a “truism of the law enforcement profession that law enforcement officers lie ... [in an attempt] to justify inappropriate, unethical, and illegal actions taken by them.” Fortunately for all of us, we resolve cases and controversies with evidence, not self-aggrandizing “truisms.” His offerings as to whether a witness is telling the truth will not be admissible as expert — or even lay — opinion. His report is rife with rank guesswork.

Parker goes on to opine that Mr. George probably could not have coherently said what the deputies say he said because he had aphasia. Was not Mr. Parker aware of the pre 9-1-1 conversation between husband and wife? Mr. George’s voice can be heard clearly on the 9-1-1 call recording, which Parker claims he listened to when preparing his declaration. ■ Or of Mrs. George’s description of his responses to her pleas? Now, Parker is a speech pathology expert in aphasia. Undaunted, he goes in to guess that Mr. George “had no idea whatsoever that the deputies were in his yard or issuing commands to him.” I assume this is part of the “evidence” the district court struck from the record when the court concluded that Parker was not a qualified “medical expert.”

More fundamentally, however, Parker’s report — which is a classic example of Monday morning quarterbacking — is of restricted value in this setting. His report suffers most of the problems identified by us in Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc). There, we said, “The fact that an expert disagrees with an officer’s actions does not render the officer’s actions unreasonable. The inquiry is not ‘whether another reasonable or more reasonable interpretation of events can be constructed ... after the fact.’ Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was justified.” Id. at 1170 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). Id. We also said, “The fact that [the expert] disagrees with the steps [taken by the deputy] is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of [the deputy’s] conduct.” Id.; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 20 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 (warning against “inappropriate second-guessing of police officers’ split-second decisions”).

Parker also paints a naive picture of domestic calm in the George residence when the officers arrived, leaving out why Mrs. George called 9-1-1, focusing instead to the exclusion of everything else in her statements that “everything is fine,” and that “he won’t do anything.” Probably Parker is unaware of our jurisprudence regarding domestic trouble in connection with police intervention. This might be because the F.B.I. where he was employed for most of his career does not respond to local 9-1-1 calls involving this challenging problem, where danger always lurks and where frightened spouses cannot always be expected to give a reliable picture of what had happened to provoke the call.

*856 In summary, Mr. Parker cannot be allowed as an “expert” to surmise or speculate or opine (1) that the deputies are lying, (2) that he doesn’t believe Mr. George knew the deputies were in his backyard or that he could hear the deputies commands, (3) that Mr. George could not have uttered any coherent words in response to the deputies commands, and (4) that Deputy Schmidt could not see a gun in Mr. George’s hands when Deputy Schmidt was yelling at him on the patio. What is left of Mr. Parker’s report that is relevant or material to the issues of excessive force? Nothing. There is no such thing as an expert on these issues short of medically-trained personnel familiar with Mr. George’s senses. Apparently Mr. George was coherent and responsive — if not rational — in his conversations with his wife, but Mr. Parker appears to believe that capacity evaporated when he walked onto his patio.

VI

Simply put, there is no competent admissible direct or circumstantial evidence in this record to prove or even to suggest under rigorous Scott v. Henrich 3 review that Mr. George did not point his gun at Deputy Rogers before he was shot. The disputes cited by the district court are not material, and the remainder of the plaintiffs evidence is demonstrably not competent either to resolve the ultimate issue of excessive force or the deputies’ credibility.

What we are inexorably left with is a situation (1) where the deputies had incontrovertible cause to believe Mr. George posed “a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer[s] or to others,” (2) where he had threatened them with a weapon, and (3) where he had been given a warning to drop the gun. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 .

These are life and death encounters. Focusing on inconsequential details out of context distorts the totality of the facts and leads one to errant conclusions. No reasonable factfinder could conclude on this record that the disputed use of force was unreasonable or excessive. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff could not survive Rule 50(a). The plaintiffs theory that the deputies simply gunned down a harmless man is nothing more than groundless conjecture. The plaintiffs evidence in this case examined “as a whole” is no better than the plaintiffs evidence in Scott v. Harris or in Wilkinson v. Torres. Her case is not “supportable by the record.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis omitted); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“[Tjhere is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmov-ing party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”) This is not just a case where something like a videotape demolishes the plaintiffs factual allegations, it is a situation where the plaintiff has no case at all, because, among other deficiencies, her own words spoken just four hours after the shooting undercut what her lawsuit now claims. Her statement in the main was the compelling evidentiary equivalent of the videotape in Scott v. Harris. Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir.2011) (“The Scott opinion does not focus on the characteristics of a videotape, but on ‘the record.’ ”).

VII

Why does all of this matter? It matters because the doctrine of qualified immunity *857 requires the judiciary to refrain from inappropriately intruding into and interfering with the assigned responsibilities of the executive branch of government. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed this concern and determined it to be so substantial that qualified immunity is not just a “mere defense to liability,” but an “immunity from suit.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original). Fleshing out this defense, the Court has called it “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.... ” Id. Moreover, the Court also emphasized that the immunity “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. at 526-27 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . It is for this reason that a district court’s denial of qualified immunity is immediately ap-pealable. Id. This reasoning distinguishes denials of normal interlocutory decisions which are not immediately appealable, and this interlocutory decision which is.

The Supreme Court’s rationale for this doctrine finds it roots in the Court’s recognition that a rule to the contrary would have significant and undesirable costs “to society as a whole.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2nd Cir.1949)) (brackets in original).

This doctrine is not of recent vintage. In an article cited in a footnote by the Court in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , we discover that

Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 S.Ct. Rev. 281 (quoting Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dali. 357, 363, 1 L.Ed. 174 (Pa.Sup.Ct.1788)). Scott v. Harris follows inexorably from the preemptive purpose of the doctrine and wisely calibrates Johnson v. Jones accordingly.

Thus, we must remand with instructions to grant the motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and enter judgment for the defendants. Mr. Kaehn had it right: To do otherwise is not fair to the sheriffs.

. The Eleventh Circuit in Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir.2005), made the same analytical mistake in its run-up to the Supreme Court, focusing not on the facts and circumstances of the case before it, but on phantom facts and circumstances that were not relevant. I quote from its opinion. “[TJaking the facts from the non-movant's viewpoint, Harris remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road.... Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed Harris, the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of • the nearby intersections.” Id. at 815-16 . The court continued to highlight similar irrelevancies in a footnote, saying, "accepting Harris’ version of events, Harris did not attempt to ram, run over, side-swipe, or swerve into any of the officers....” Id. at 816 n. 11. Not one of these irrelevant observations deterred the Supreme Court from its holding granting immunity to the officers who rammed Harris's car in order to stop him.

. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.1994); Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir.2002).