Barrett

Christine Barrett is an adult who has long been diagnosed with mental retardation and other mental disorders, and who has lived in the community while being supported and supervised by others. Because of her increasingly violent behavior, Barrett became the subject of this proceeding to civilly commit her as a “mentally retarded person” who is a “danger” to herself or others. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 6500 (section 6500).) 2 The People sought placement in a secure treatment facility pursuant to the statutory scheme.

Following a nonjury trial in which Barrett was represented by counsel, the trial court sustained the allegations of the petition. The court ordered her *1089 committed for one year to the State Department of Developmental Services (Department), and otherwise approved the requested placement. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. This court granted Barrett’s petition for review.

We now decide whether the Court of Appeal properly rejected Barrett’s claims that she was denied due process and equal protection of the law insofar as the record does not reveal the circumstances under which she was tried by the court, rather than by a jury. The statutory scheme does…

I agree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant Christine Barrett was entitled to have a jury decide whether the state had proven she met the statutory standards for involuntary commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500. 1 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1096.) But the majority’s next step in its analysis is unpersuasive: it finds that although mentally ill persons facing involuntary civil commitment under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.) are entitled by statute to have the court advise them “of [their] right to demand a jury trial” (§ 5302), persons—like Barrett—who, are alleged to be mentally retarded and a danger to themselves or others who similarly face involuntary civil commitment are not entitled to the same jury advisement. As Justice Liu explains in his separate opinion, the differences between mentally ill persons and those alleged to be mentally retarded “do not support a categorical distinction between the two groups with respect to a jury right advisement.” (Cone. & dis. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 1129.)

Article I, section 24 of the California Constitution provides that “[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on…

To most people who are thrust into a courtroom, the whir and din of the legal process make for a bewildering experience. Counsel is necessary, but even diligent representation does not always ensure due regard for the dignity of a vulnerable yet dangerous individual whose liberty is at stake.

*1115 In this case, a young woman, Christine Barrett, was found mentally retarded and dangerous by a judge, and she was ordered committed to a secure treatment facility. Barrett was not charged with any crime, and the record does not show any criminal history. The order of commitment was for one year, but it is renewable year after year without limit. In all likelihood, the commitment proceeding has irreversibly altered the course of her life. And yet, there is no indication in the record of the proceedings that the trial court spoke directly to Barrett about her rights or any other substantive matter.

The trial court found that Barrett, in addition to having mental retardation, also suffered from mental illness. If Barrett had faced prolonged involuntary commitment on the basis of mental illness instead of mental retardation, she would have been statutorily entitled to an advisement by the…

Filed 7/30/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

) Plaintiff and Respondent, ) ) S180612 v. ) ) Ct.App. 6 H034154

CHRISTINE BARRETT, )

) Santa Clara County Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. MH034663 ____________________________________)

Christine Barrett is an adult who has long been diagnosed with mental retardation and other mental disorders, and who has lived in the community while being supported and supervised by others. Because of her increasingly violent behavior, Barrett became the subject of this proceeding to civilly commit her as a ―mentally retarded person‖ who is a ―danger‖ to herself or others. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 6500 (section 6500).)2 The People sought placement in a secure treatment facility pursuant to the statutory scheme.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Barrett suggests that ―mental retardation‖ and closely related phrases are outmoded expressions for persons with subaverage cognitive and adaptive…