Jones
People v. Jones
Opinion
Concurring Opinion
Werdegar, J.
Although I agree with the majority’s result, I write separately to explain my view of the correct approach to applying Penal Code section 654 in this case and cases generally.
The majority concludes that pursuant to section 654, defendant, a felon found with a loaded pistol in his car, can be punished only once notwithstanding his behavior violated three different criminal statutes. Although I agree with this result, I join Justice Liu’s separate opinion because the majority does not persuasively explain how it has determined defendant *361 committed only one punishable act. As Justice Liu states, we should apply the test set forth in Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 607 , 357 P.2d 839 ] (Neal), which held that “[w]hether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Italics added; see cone. opn. of Liu, J., post, at p. 369.) Because the evidence demonstrates defendant acted with…
Concurring Opinion
Liu, J.
I agree with the court that Penal Code section 654 (section 654) permits only one punishment in this case. I also agree with our decision to overrule In re Hayes (1969) 70 Cal.2d 604 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 451 P.2d 430 ] and to disapprove People v. Harrison (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 115 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 396 ]. Unlike the court, however, I would not rest the judgment in this case on the ground that Jarvonne Feredell Jones’s three crimes involved “a single physical act.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 358.) In applying section 654, reasonable minds can and often do differ on how to define the “act” that constitutes a crime; as explained below, the present facts provide a case in point. Today’s opinion provides little guidance for making that determination, as revealed by the court’s repeated assertion that “[w]e express no opinion on what the outcome might be under other facts.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 359.) The lack of guidance all but invites future litigation, and California courts will continue to struggle to achieve consistent and predictable application of section 654.
I prefer that we decide today’s case on the basis of precedent—imperfect precedent, but precedent nonetheless. In situations…
Lead Opinion
Chin, J.
*352 Opinion
Defendant Jarvonne Feredell Jones, a convicted felon, carried a loaded and concealed firearm. We must decide to what extent, if any, he may be punished separately for the crimes of possession of a firearm by a felon, carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm, and carrying an unregistered loaded firearm in public. The question requires us to interpret Penal Code section 654, 1 which prohibits multiple punishment for “[a]n act . . . that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law.” Because different provisions of law punish in different ways defendant’s single act, we conclude that section 654’s plain language prohibits punishment for more than one of those crimes.
I. Factual And Procedural History
On May 26, 2008, police searched the car defendant, a convicted felon, was driving and found in a door panel a loaded .38-caliber revolver that was not registered to him. Defendant said he had bought the gun already loaded three days earlier “for protection.” He explained that he had kept the gun at his grandmother’s house and had “just picked the gun up from there and that’s why the gun was in the car.”
A jury convicted…
Opinion
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 26, 2008, police searched the car defendant, a convicted felon, was driving and found in a door panel a loaded .38-caliber revolver that was not registered to him. Defendant said he had bought the gun already loaded three days earlier ―for protection.‖ He explained that he had kept the gun at his grandmother‘s house and had ―just picked the gun up from there and that‘s why the gun was in the car.‖ A jury convicted defendant of three crimes: possession of a firearm by a felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1) [now § 29800, subd. (a)(1) (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6)]; count one), carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm (former § 12025, subd. (b)(6) [now § 25400, subd. (c)(6) (as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 543)]; count two), and carrying an unregistered loaded firearm in public (former § 12031, subd. (a)(2)(F) [now § 25850, subd. (c)(6) (as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 544)]; count three). The superior court sentenced him to state prison for the upper term of three years on each count, to be served concurrently, plus a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term, for a total sentence of four years. Defendant…