Cravens

The issue presented in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence to support defendant Seth Cravens’s conviction of second degree murder under a theory of implied malice. The Court of Appeal held there was not. After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient and therefore reverse the Court of Appeal.

Background

Defendant was convicted by a jury of various crimes against a number of victims: one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422); one count of battery (id., § 242); four counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, one of which was enhanced because defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (id., §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)); and one count of second degree murder (id., § 187, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to 20 years to life. Because the issues in this proceeding concern only the murder conviction, we limit our factual recitation to the circumstances of that crime.

The principal characters, including defendant, then 21 years old, and the decedent, Emery Kauanui, 24, were all at the La Jolla Brew House on the night of May 23, 2007. Kauanui, a professional surfer, was…

I write separately to comment on the relevant standard for implied malice, which is statutorily defined in relevant part as “when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (Pen. Code, § 188.)

We have previously acknowledged two lines of decisions that attempt to delineate the objective and subjective components of implied malice. The first derives from Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470 [ 261 P.2d 1 ] (Thomas), which said implied malice is shown when “the defendant for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.” (Id. at p. 480 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).) The second line derives from People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 414 P.2d 353 ] (Phillips) (overruled on another ground in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ]), which described implied malice murder as a “ ‘killing [which] proximately resulted from an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who…

Someone who unlawfully kills a person without deliberately intending to do so is guilty of second degree murder if the act resulting in death is done with implied malice, which means the deliberate performance of an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to life, with knowledge that the act endangers the life of another.

Here, without warning, a right-handed defendant used his left hand to punch a man once in the head, causing the man to hit his head on the *515 pavement, fatally injuring him. That incident led to a murder charge. Although the prosecution’s theory at trial was second degree murder, it presented no evidence to satisfy either the requirement that the natural consequences of the punch included death, or the requirement that defendant knew the act was dangerous to life. A jury nonetheless convicted defendant of second degree murder. A unanimous Court of Appeal panel concluded there was insufficient evidence of implied malice to support the second degree murder conviction. Unlike today’s majority, I would uphold that conclusion.

I

On the night of May 23, 2007, while at a bar, Emery Kauanui had an argument with defendant Seth Cravens. To prevent a fight, a bar…

The issue presented in this case is whether there is sufficient evidence to support defendant Seth Cravens's conviction of second degree murder under a theory of implied malice. The Court of Appeal held there was not. After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient and therefore reverse the Court of Appeal.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of various crimes against a number of victims: one count of making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422); one count of battery ( id., § 242); four counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, one of which was enhanced because defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury ( id., §§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)); and one count of second degree murder ( id., § 187, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to 20 years to life. Because the issues in this proceeding concern only the murder conviction, we limit our factual recitation to the circumstances of that crime.

The principal characters, including defendant, then 21 years old, and the decedent, Emery Kauanui, 24, were all at the La Jolla Brew House on the night of May 23, 2007. Kauanui, a professional surfer, was sitting at…