In Re Shaputis

Here we reaffirm the deferential character of the “some evidence” standard for reviewing parole suitability determinations. Whether *199 to grant parole to an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence is a decision vested in the executive branch, under our state Constitution and statutes. The scope of judicial review is limited. The “some evidence” standard, which we articulated in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 ] (Rosenkrantz) and refined in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ] (Lawrence), is meant to serve the interests of due process by guarding against arbitrary or capricious parole decisions, without overriding or controlling the exercise of executive discretion. (Ro senkrantz, at pp. 664-665; Lawrence , at p. 1212.)

This is our second grant of review to consider whether a majority of Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal properly applied the “some evidence” standard to a decision denying parole for petitioner Richard Shaputis. Previously, we decided the majority had correctly asked whether the evidence supported a finding that petitioner posed a current threat to public…

I concur in the majority opinion, with the exception of footnote 11 on pages 214—215. Because the issue addressed there is not before the court, and the majority’s comments are unnecessary to the resolution of the case, I would await a future case specifically posing that issue.

I dissented in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ] (Lawrence). I believed then, and still believe, the majority opinion in that case was ill considered. Lawrence is largely responsible for the confusion in the Courts of Appeal that today’s opinion seeks to ameliorate. However, my view in Lawrence did not prevail, and I now accept the majority view. For this reason, I concur entirely in this case.

As today’s opinion explains, the Court of Appeal was incorrect to conclude that earlier evidence of lack of insight had “evaporated” *222 in light of more recent psychological reports, particularly when petitioner declined to be interviewed by the psychologist appointed by California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and to speak to the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) about his commitment offense or his social history. “[A]n inmate who restricts the Board’s access to current information is in no position to complain about the Board’s reliance on other relevant evidence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 199.)

The court’s opinion today goes beyond this holding in an effort to clarify the “some evidence” standard of review and to provide guidance regarding lack of insight as a suitability factor. The court’s commentary on both issues prompts me to offer some additional remarks.

I. Parole Decisions and the “Some Evidence” Standard

In light of the Court of Appeal’s overreaching in this case, today’s decision correctly emphasizes that judicial review of Board decisions is deferential: “While the evidence supporting a parole unsuitability finding must be probative of the…

Here we reaffirm the deferential character of the "some evidence" standard for reviewing parole suitability determinations. Whether to grant parole to an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence is a decision vested in the executive branch, under our state Constitution and statutes. The scope of judicial review is limited. The "some evidence" standard, which we articulated in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 ] ( Rosenkrantz ) and refined in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ] ( Lawrence ), is meant to serve the interests of due process by guarding against arbitrary or capricious parole decisions, without overriding or controlling the exercise of executive discretion. ( Rosenkrantz, at pp. 664-665; Lawrence , at p. 1212.)

This is our second grant of review to consider whether a majority of Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal properly applied the "some evidence" standard to a decision denying parole for petitioner Richard Shaputis. Previously, we decided the majority had correctly asked whether the evidence supported a finding that petitioner posed a current threat to…