In re V.V.

In this case, V.V. and J.H., minors, set off a firecracker on a brush-covered hillside in Pasadena, causing a fire that burned five acres of forest land. At a combined adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court determined that V.V. and J.H. had committed arson. The court found that, although they did not intend to set the hillside on fire, the evidence satisfied the mental state required for arson.

In V.V.’s case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order, finding that the evidence sufficiently established the requisite mental state of malice because V.V. deliberately and intentionally set off a firecracker on a brush-covered hill. In J.H.’s case, a different division of the Court of Appeal found that the intentional act of setting off a firecracker on a brush-covered hill without intent to do harm is insufficient to establish the element of malice.

We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, V.V.’s and J.H.’s acts of intentionally igniting and throwing a firecracker amid dry brush on a hillside, although done without intent to cause a fire or other harm, were sufficient to establish the requisite malice for arson.

*1024 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL…

One dry summer day, two teenagers lit a type of firecracker commonly known as a “cherry bomb” and threw it down a brush-covered hill. When the cherry bomb exploded, the brush caught fire. The teenagers who threw the cherry bomb (V.V. and J.H.) were captured and were later found guilty in juvenile court of arson of forest land. (Pen. Code, §451, subd. (c).)

The majority here upholds the juvenile court’s finding. I disagree. As Justice Werdegar’s dissent (which I have signed) persuasively explains, the evidence is insufficient to show that V.V. and J.H. acted with malice, a necessary element of the crime of arson. Instead, they were guilty only of reckless fire setting (§ 452), which is a serious crime but not so serious as arson. I write to comment on the majority’s erroneous assertion that the fire started by V.V. and J.H. was not accidentally set.

As this court explained in People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76 .[ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ], California’s arson statute applies only to fires that are set deliberately, not to those set accidentally. The statutory requirement that the defendant act willfully and with malice, we said, “ensures that the setting of the fire…

majority opinion, in my view, comports with neither the facts nor the law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

*1035 The minors in this case played with fireworks on the edge of the Angeles National Forest shortly after July 4th, when fireworks were plentiful and the brush was dry. Their reckless conduct would, if committed by adults, have constituted the felony of unlawfully causing a fire. (See Pen. Code, § 452.) 1 Contrary to the majority, however, I conclude the minors’ conduct did not amount to arson. (§ 451.)

A person is guilty of arson when he or she “willfully and maliciously sets fire to . . . forest land . . . .” (§ 451.) “Willfully,” for all practical purposes, means nothing more than that the prohibited act was intentionally done. (See People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 85 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 738 , 18 P.3d 660 ] (Atkins).) The term “implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act ... . It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another . . . .” (§ 7, par. 1.) There is no dispute that the minors “willfully”— that is intentionally—lit the firecracker that started the fire. In contrast, the term “maliciously” imports an additional element,…

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the afternoon of July 18, 2008, V.V. and J.H. (both 17-year-olds) joined a friend to climb a steep hill located behind a residential street in Pasadena. V.V. lit a large firecracker, which J.H. threw onto the brush-covered hillside. The firecracker exploded and caused a five-acre brush fire. Abel Ramirez, a Pasadena resident, heard a ―very loud explosion‖ from his backyard patio. He immediately saw smoke rising from the hillside and saw flames several minutes later. Shortly thereafter, Ramirez saw three young men running down the hill from the fire‘s point of origin. The fire was rapidly spreading, coming within 60 to 75 feet of a residence. Ramirez called 911 to report the fire and described the three young men. At a field show-up that day and

2 at the adjudicatory hearing, Ramirez identified V.V. and J.H. as two of the three young men running down the hill. Ara Moujoukian, Ramirez‘s neighbor, heard kids laughing, yelling, and ―having a good time‖ outside his house. He heard them exclaiming ―Wow,‖ ―Look,‖ ―Did you see that,‖ and ―Fire.‖ Moujoukian went outside and saw three boys laughing and ―high-fiving‖ each other. When Moujoukian asked,…