Williams v. Johnson
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Kozinski, J.
Dissent by Judge REINHARDT
ORDER
The unopposed motion for leave to file an amicus brief is GRANTED. With this amendment the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc is DENIED. Fed. R. App. P. 35. The conclusion of Judge Reinhardt’s dissenting opinion is amended as follows:
*1006 OPINION
During deliberations in the California murder trial of Tara Williams, the court dismissed a juror who was holding out for acquittal. An alternate juror was seated, and the jury convicted. We consider whether Williams is entitled to habeas relief on the ground that the dismissal of the holdout juror violated her Sixth Amendment rights.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the fall of 1993, Williams drove two of her friends around Long Beach, casing stores for a potential robbery, Williams eventually stopped at a liquor store. While Williams and her infant son waited in the car, her two friends went inside, murdered the store owner and robbed the cash register of $6 and food stamps. Williams was later charged with felony murder.
After the jury retired, the foreman sent a note claiming that one juror had “expressed an intention to disregard the law.” Judge Richard R. Romero and counsel…
Dissenting Opinion
Reinhardt, J.
dissenting:
Tara Williams is in prison for life following her conviction of murder after a California state trial judge dismissed a lone holdout juror who favored acquittal, and the state appellate court affirmed that dismissal. The majority now affirms, holding that the state appellate court’s finding that the trial judge dismissed the holdout juror for being unwilling to follow the law was not subject to reversal under § 2254 of AEDPA.
*1010 There is one problem, however—the trial court did not dismiss Williams for being unwilling to follow the law. To the contrary, the trial court’s reasoning is plain: “I’m going to dismiss the juror, but not because he’s not deliberating and not became he’s not following the law” (emphasis added). Although the trial judge explicitly stated that he did not dismiss the juror for being unwilling to follow the law, and although there is no reason to doubt this statement, the state appellate court found the direct opposite—that the trial court dismissed the holdout juror for being unwilling to follow the law—and based its affirmance primarily on that finding. The appellate court’s finding was clearly “based on an unreasonable determination of the…