United States v. Smith

*857 MEMORANDUM **

Given the parties’ stipulation that the gun crossed state lines at some point before it came into Smith’s possession, there was sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to conclude that Smith, a convicted felon, did unlawfully “possess in or affecting commerce” a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1) (emphasis added).

Our precedents have repeatedly refused to read any “recency” requirement into the statute, even after the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 , 115 S.Ct. 1624 , 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 , 120 S.Ct. 1740 , 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 , 1462 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1995) (“Congress sought to reach possessions broadly, with little concern for when the nexus with commerce occurred.... [A] past connection is enough____ We have read and considered United States v. Lopez ..., but it does not alter our analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Casterline, 103 F.3d 76, 77 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to construe section 922(g) as “requiring a time of [interstate] transportation reasonably close to the…