Neaves

MEMORANDUM *

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ denial of access to the courts claim and the district court’s summary judgment of appellants’ (1) claims of deprivation of equal protection and (2) claim of an unreasonable seizure.

*430 I

Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their denial of access to courts claim. The Supreme Court recently clarified the nature of the denial of access claim. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 , 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). In Christopher , the Supreme Court distinguishes between forward-looking and backward-looking claims. Id. at 414 . The Supreme Court notes that in order to state a claim for backward-looking denial of access, a party must identify in the complaint (1) a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable” underlying claim, whether anticipated or lost; (2) the official acts frustrating the litigation; and (3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. Id. at 415 .

The Court in Christopher does not establish a new rule, but rather articulates the common elements of the backward-looking denial of access claim as recognized by various…

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur in Parts I and III of the memorandum disposition. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decision in Part II to affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of the Neaves’ equal protection claim. Because there are triable issues of fact regarding the defendant officers’ intent, I would reverse the district court’s ruling on this claim and remand for further proceedings.

As noted by the majority, we have recognized an equal protection claim when police officers have allegedly acted with discriminatory intent in refusing to investigate alleged criminal acts against a victim. See e.g., Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2000); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716-17 (9th Cir.1995). Although the Macias and Navarro claims were either brought by the victim or the estate of a deceased victim, I do not believe that the equal protection analysis we *433 employed in those cases should be limited to plaintiffs who were crime victims, as the majority seems to suggest. Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that all persons who are similarly situated are entitled to equal treatment by government…