Crume

MEMORANDUM **

Appellant Kristin Crume (“Crume”) appeals the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (“District Court”)’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Marathon Media, L.P. (“Marathon”), on a retaliation claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). The District Court held that, although Crume established a prima facie claim of retaliatory discharge against Marathon, she was unable to demonstrate that Marathon’s nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were a pretext for retaliation. Because Crume raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her retaliation claim, we reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Marathon.

The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of the case. Thus, we recite only those necessary to explain our disposition.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). “We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.” Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (9th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most…

dissenting.

Kristin Crume appeals the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Marathon Media, L.P. (“Marathon”). Crume argues that Marathon acted with retaliatory intent by terminating her, due to gender-based discrimination complaints she had made to the Marathon management, in violation of Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). In my view, Crume did not present sufficient evidence to the district court to demonstrate that Marathon’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Crume, as part of a set of terminations incidental to broad changes in station programming and on-air personalities after an acquisition of the station, were a pretext for a retaliatory discharge under Title VII or the WLAD. See Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.2003); see also Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal, 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir.2002). I would affirm the judgment of the district court essentially for the reasons stated in my dissent in Stegall v. Citadel Broadcasting Co., 350 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.2003). I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the summary judgment dismissing Crume’s claims.