Timmins

MEMORANDUM **

Dennis Timmins appeals his jury conviction on three counts of unarmed bank robbery, one count of armed bank robbery and a firearms offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924 (c)(1) and 2113(a) and (d). We remand for a determination of whether Timmins’ decision to go to trial rather than to accept an offered plea bargain was made competently. If the district court holds on remand that Timmins’ decision was in fact competent, his conviction will stand, though the sentences imposed on the three counts of unarmed bank robbery must be reduced to the statutory maximum of twenty years. If, on the other hand, the court holds that Timmins was not competent, his convictions must be vacated. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here.

We first hold that the district court’s inquiry into Timmins’ competency was too limited. 1 The problem stems from the district court’s decision, without further input from mental health professionals, that the appointment of new counsel somehow cured Timmins’ previously demonstrated delusional mindset. 2 While Tim *555 mins may have met the first prong of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (a), by being able “to understand the nature…

dissenting in part.

What troubles me about the panel memorandum is that it fails to require that the case be returned to a true status quo on remand — that is, to make the original plea offer available to Timmins if he is found not to have made a competent decision to go to trial, but if he is found competent at this time to choose between accepting that plea and going to trial. Accordingly I respectfully dissent in that limited respect.

Let me make plain that what I have just said is conditioned on a finding being made on remand, pursuant to a hearing under Sections 4241 and 4247(d), that any current decision by Timmins is a rational one, unimpaired by the delusional and psychotic disorders identified by both Dr. Gwinnell and Dr. Frederick. If that proves not to be the case, the provisions of Section 4241(d) and perhaps ultimately Section 4246 will come into play.

But as to the first-mentioned alternative of (1) Timmins’ having earlier lacked competency (which would involve both professionals’ psychiatric and psychological evaluations being upheld on remand) coupled with (2) Timmins being found capable of making a rational choice now, I believe that he is entitled to a real…