Clayton
Clayton v. Morrow
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM *
Mark J. Clayton appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The state court’s post-convic *936 tion determination that Clayton faded to prove ineffective assistance of counsel was not objectively unreasonable, and therefore we affirm.
Discussion
As the Supreme Court reminded us in Yarborough v. Gentry,
Yarborough, — U.S.—, 124 S.Ct. 1, 4 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534-35 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Wood-ford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 , 123 S.Ct. 357 , 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 , 120 S.Ct. 1495 , 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)).
The state court concluded that Clayton’s allegations that his counsel misled him as to the law are not true. This determination is amply supported by the record. Although defense counsel’s letter may have been somewhat ambiguous, it contained no clear misstatement of the law. It was not at all objectively unreasonable to regard defense counsel’s representation in the seventh paragraph, that consent is no defense, as referring to the second degree sexual abuse charge. Under Oregon law, it is an entirely accurate statement that…