Duncan

MEMORANDUM **

Mark Duncan and Eric Munz appeal from the district court’s dismissal as untimely of their Privacy Act claim against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

We review whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and when the statute began to run, de novo. See Orr v. Bank of Amer., 285 F.3d 764, 779-80 (9th Cir.2002). “[W]hen uncontroverted evidence proves that the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the facts giving rise to the claim, such a determination can be made as a matter of law.” Id. at 780 (quotations omitted).

The Privacy Act’s two-year statute of limitations begins when the person knows or has reason to know of the alleged violation. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5); Rose v. United States, 905 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.1990). It is uncontroverted that Duncan and Munz wrote a letter on July 28, 1997, stating that they faced retaliation after their boss learned of their whistle-blowing. They therefore knew, and informed others, of the EPA’s alleged disclosure of their identities in violation of the Act in July 1997, placing their January 2000 complaint well outside the…