Walker

MEMORANDUM *

This memorandum disposition supplements the opinion filed concurrently herewith.

1. The district court did not err in dismissing Walker’s claims against defendant Gomez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , as “[liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989).

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker’s request for additional time to amend the complaint. Pro se civil litigants are not excepted from court-ordered deadlines. See Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 163 (7th Cir.1994); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1987).

3. We reverse in part summary judgment as to defendants Reed, Garcia, Tutt and Janda with respect to Walker’s claims for emotional distress. The Elev *203 enth Amendment does not bar state-law claims against defendants sued in their personal capacities. See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam). In Ashker v. California Department of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392 (9th Cir.1997), we held that Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 , 112 S.Ct. 358 , 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), guides us in determining whether a defendant has…