Ellis

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order should be affirmed. However, I would do so on the merits. I would hold that Ellis has prudential standing to pursue an appeal of the bankruptcy court order absent a final determination that he has no right, title, or interest in the property at issue and the Second Amended and Restated Kulamanu Development Agreement. See Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.2000).

MEMORANDUM **

William S. Ellis, Jr. appeals the district court’s order dismissing his appeal of a bankruptcy court order because he was not an “aggrieved party” entitled to appeal the decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we dismiss the case.

In addition to the traditional standing requirements, the bankruptcy court imposes an additional prudential standing requirement that a party must be a “ ‘person aggrieved’ by the bankruptcy court’s order.” Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir.1999). “An appellant is aggrieved if ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court’; in other words, the order must diminish the appellant’s property, increase its burdens, or detrimentally affect its rights.” Id. (citing Fondiller v. Roberston (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir.1983)).

Whether Ellis is a “person aggrieved” is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. Id. The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish standing to sue. See San Diego Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121 , 1126 (9th Cir.1996).

Ellis alleges that the bankruptcy court’s order…