Short

dissenting:

As it is founded on benevolent motives, the novel path constructed by the majority opinion in this case is reminiscent of the cliche, “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.” We not only build that pro *741 verbial highway but advance our vehicle far along it by assuming the role of settlement-conference judges, rather than accepting our position as appellate judges, and by disregarding controlling authorities that serve as traffic signals commanding us to stop. In sum, because the lane down which the majority travels finds no support in binding Idaho law, and actually detours around it, I respectfully dissent.

Short settled a personal injury claim stemming from a car accident in 1984. Her structured settlement provided that she would receive certain periodic payments beginning in 1986 and continuing until 2045. In 1998, Short entered a purchase agreement with Singer, wherein she expressly waived an anti-assignment provision in her settlement agreement and assigned three of her settlement payments to Singer in exchange for $35,900. Just months after the first settlement payment was due to be assigned to Singer, Short filed a declaratory-relief action seeking…

MEMORANDUM *

Pamela L. Short seeks to invoke the anti-assignment clause of her structured settlement in order to avoid her obligations under a subsequent contract, in which she purported to assign certain settlement payments to Singer Asset Finance Co. (“Singer”). Short appeals the district court’s judgment as well as the subsequent award of attorney’s fees. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.

As an initial matter, we find that the structured settlement’s anti-assignment clause deprived Short of not only the right to make the assignment to Singer, but also the power to do so. The parties’ intention in this regard is clearly manifested by the plain language of the structured settlement’s anti-assignment clause, which expressly curtails Short’s “power” to assign. See Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston v. Stone Street Capital, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 630, 637 (D.Md.2000); see also Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir.1999) (noting that the parties’ clearly manifested intention controls). This language of the anti-assignment clause stands in contrast to other prohibitions in the structured settlement, which state that particular steps “cannot” be taken…