Tabalanza

MEMORANDUM *

Dunard Purísima Tabalanza petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ordering him removed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(iii), which makes an alien removable for having committed an aggravated felony. “Aggravated felony” is defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(A) to include “sexual abuse of a minor.” Tabalanza argues that he has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(A).

We do not have jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a[n aggravated felony.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C). We do have jurisdiction, however, to consider the limited question of whether we have jurisdiction. That is, we may review whether Tabalanza has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined under § 1101(a)(43)(A). Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003).

Under the “categorical approach” laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. *996 575 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), “[t]he crime defined by [§ 261.5(c)] qualifies as ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ and hence an aggravated felony if and only if the full range of conduct…

concurring.

The majority takes too expansive a view of the modified categorical approach by taking account of things other than “the charging documents in conjunction with the plea agreement, the transcript of a plea proceeding, or the judgment to determine whether the defendant pled guilty” to an aggravated felony. 1 I think (though there is room for doubt) the authorities we must follow would lead to the same result under the categorical approach, so I am concurring rather than dissenting.

. United States v. Coron-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir.2002) (enbanc).