Hubbard

MEMORANDUM **

To qualify as “burglary of a dwelling” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) for purposes of sentence enhancement under id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), Hubbard’s prior conviction must, as a threshold matter, have been for “burglary” within the meaning of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2003). The Nevada burglary statute under which Hubbard was convicted is broader than burglary under Taylor , since the Nevada statute contemplates burglary of, among other things, a “vehicle” or “railroad car,” which are not “building[s] or structure^” under Taylor. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599 ; Wenner, 351 F.3d at 972 . Therefore, under a formal categorical approach, Hubbard’s Nevada burglary conviction could not be used to enhance his sentence.

Under Taylor’s modified categorical approach, Hubbard’s conviction is likewise inadequate for sentence enhancement. Hubbard was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, burglarizing a “dwelling building,” and he referred to burglarizing a “house” in his plea colloquy. Neither of these terms is defined under Nevada law, and we cannot say unequivocally that…