Rosas-Lopez

Rosas-Lopez v. Ashcroft

Good Law
120 F. App'x 161
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJanuary 14, 2005No. 02-71599; Agency Nos. A92-280-707, A92-280-898California500 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Andres Rosas-Lopez and Ernestina Torres Rosas, the petitioners, are natives and citizens of Mexico. They are married and have five children. Four of the children are natives and citizens of Mexico; one child is a native and citizen of the United States. The U.S. citizen child has severe health problems and requires frequent medical attention in the United States.

The Rosases have lived in the United States since the mid-1980s. They were served with Notices to Appear in 1998. During removal proceedings the Rosases applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). On May 12, 1999 an Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the Rosases failed to qualify for cancellation of removal because they could not establish “good moral character.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B). The IJ determined that the Rosases had engaged in alien smuggling by bringing their four non-citizen children into the United States on valid 72-hour border crossing cards. The IJ determined that although the children’s entry was legal, the Rosases intended to keep their children in the United States in violation of the terms of the border crossing cards. Thus, the IJ held that the Rosases’ actions…

Dissenting Opinion

Rymer, J.

dissenting.

I would deny the petition because the Rosases used 72-hour border passes to transport their non-citizen children across the border with the preconceived intent to settle them here permanently. This was an illegal use of the pass, and I cannot say that the Immigration Judge’s determina *163 tion that the Rosases thereby knowingly assisted another alien to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law is plainly contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6)(E). Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that BIA’s interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference, except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute).

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