Dunshee

MEMORANDUM *

Jay Dee Dunshee, an insanity acquittee, appeals the district court’s order revoking *200 his conditional discharge and recommitting him to a mental institution. Dunshee contends the district court erred by revoking his conditional discharge on the ground Dunshee’s “continued release would create a substantial risk of self injury,” instead of on the ground that Dunshee posed a “substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (g). Before we heard oral argument, Dunshee again was conditionally discharged and released from commitment. Because we can no longer provide the relief sought by Dunshee (reversal of his commitment order), and the appeal does not fall within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception, we hold the appeal is moot and dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.

The parties are familiar with the facts and we do not recite them here. An appeal becomes moot when it no longer presents a “case or controversy” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Throughout the proceedings (including during…