Dickson

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Bertrand Dickson (“Dickson”) challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his petition for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . He claims that the District Court erred in dismissing his federal habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) because he was entitled to interval tolling between his first and second rounds of state habeas petitions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss a federal habeas petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1). King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 822 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam). For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.

*314 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2), the running of the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations period is “statutorily tolled” while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” A state petition is “pending” under § 2244(d)(2) if it is a “continuing ‘application’ for review and relief.” Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th…