Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Columbia Alaska Regional Hospital

Good Law
126 F. App'x 382
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMarch 18, 2005No. 02-35884; D.C. No. CV-00-00023-A-HRHCalifornia1,600 words

Opinion

Dissenting Opinion

Wardlaw, J.

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

The record contains the EEOC’s letter of determination and the parties’ stipulated consent decree, approved and entered by the district court, which conclusively establishes that the EEOC found “there was reasonable cause to believe that Logan’s allegations [of race discrimination] were true and that [defendant] had violated Title VII.” 1 This was admissible evidence of discrimination. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 , 863 n. 39, 96 S.Ct. 1949 , 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976) (“Prior administrative findings made with respect *385 to an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as evidence at a federal sector trial de novo. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803(8)(C).”).

The EEOC’s determination was based largely on a report from the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission (the “AERC Report”), which found that Logan had established a prima facie case and that “substantial evidence exists to credit the complainant’s allegations of race discrimination.” Indeed, in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court relied heavily on the AERC Report as “not only admissible evidence, but also probative of the alleged discrimination.”…

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

We review de novo the judgment as a matter of law. 1 A directed verdict is proper when the evidence presented “permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” 2 A complainant in a Title VII discrimination claim carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 3 “In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably.” 4 Logan failed to introduce evidence that would permit a reasonable conclusion that non-black, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably than he by the hospital. He did not establish personal knowledge to support his testimony that, contrary to hospital policy, white employees who were transferred were not required to undergo a 90-day appraisal period while black employees were required to do so. Because Logan did not make out a prima facie case, the evidence permitted only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, that Logan did not…

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