Jones

MEMORANDUM **

Jones appeals from denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory traffic stop. On appeal, Jones argues that this stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and thus, that the evidence should have been suppressed. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here except as necessary to explain our conclusions.

The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement also applies to investigatory traffic stops, which must be “supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’ ” See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490

U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)); see also United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.2002). Reasonable suspicion requires “specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person detained is engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.…