Houser

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Kevin Houser (“Houser”) appeals the denial of his § 2254 habeas petition, contending that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances, contrary to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 , 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Houser points to many factors that he argues collectively contributed to the involuntariness of his plea, such as his age, mental capacity, limited time to review the plea agreement, fear of the death penalty, and failure of the state court judge to specifically inquire about his waiver of his rights.

*201 However, the voluntariness of a plea must be judged by the totality of the circumstances, Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 , 90 S.Ct. 1463 . Many factors here weigh in favor of voluntariness: Houser was represented by counsel, was able to consult with his mother, was experienced with the plea process and criminal justice system, and had been given a written plea agreement that explained his rights and his potential sentence. Houser indicated on the record that he had read and understood the plea…