United States v. Juvenile Male

MEMORANDUM *

Sixteen-year-old Juvenile Male entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 ; 1153, 2241(c); and 2246(2)(D). 1 The condition he reserved allows him to appeal the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress.

*423 Juvenile Male argues that the statements he made to Agent Robel and Investigator Begay should be suppressed because he was “in custody” at the time and he was not advised of the Miranda warnings. To determine whether an individual was “in custody,” a court must, after examining all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, decide “whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Two discrete inquiries are essential to the [‘in custody’] determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v.…

dissenting.

I do not think that the district court clearly erred 1 when it found that the juvenile (JM) was not in custody. As soon as he was contacted by the officers, and even before he went to the officers’ car, he was advised of the reason for their presence and asked if he was willing to talk about the matter; he said he was. They then asked him if he would do so in the car; he was willing to do that too. Then, before the officers asked him any questions he *424 was again asked if he was willing to talk and he was told that he was not under arrest, would not be arrested, and was free to go.

True it is that, after JM had twice said that he was willing to talk to the officers, they told him “he was not under arrest, nor would he be arrested, [and] after we were done talking he would be free to leave.” I cannot say that as a matter of law that amounts to a statement that JM was prohibited from leaving until the talk was over. Rather, the district court could decide, as it effectively did, that the statement was a natural way of saying that JM was free to go. And, of course, at any time that JM chose to stop talking, they would be finished talking, and he would be free to leave…