Ostolaza-Ayala

MEMORANDUM ***

The immigration judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to terminate removal proceedings.

The regulation at issue, 8 C.F.R. § 239.2 (f) (2001), provides that an “immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization.” The immigration judge did not err by determining that OstolazaAyala could not establish prima facie eligibility for naturalization because OstolazaAyala could not prove that he had been a person of good moral character for five years preceding the filing of his naturalization application.

Ostolaza-Ayala cannot prove he is a person of good moral character because he was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. 3 Ostolaza-Ayala argues that the petty-offense exception found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) should apply to him. The petty-offense exception, however, plainly states that the crime of moral turpitude designation “shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime” if the maximum penalty for the crime was less than a year and…