Spencer

MEMORANDUM **

Defendant-Appellant Michael Anthony Spencer (“Spencer”) waived his right to counsel and represented himself in his probation revocation proceedings. Spencer now claims that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

A. Standard of Review

Whether a waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is a mixed question of law and fact which is reviewed de novo. See United *869 States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir.1990).

B. Validity of Spencer’s “Farretta Waiver”

A criminal defendant has the constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to represent himself, if he so chooses. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). If a defendant elects to waive his right to counsel (a “Faretta Waiver”), his decision must be made knowingly and intelligently. See United States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir.1994).

According to Spencer, both the magistrate judge and the district court judge failed to thoroughly and specifically canvass him regarding his knowledge of the possible penalties…