Young

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I would hold that Young, a pro se litigant navigating the labyrinth of state and federal procedures, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was denied access to his files and correspondence.

As the majority recognizes, Young is entitled to tolling if he can justify the delay between the denial of his first state habeas petition and the subsequent filings of his second and third habeas petitions. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192-93 , 126 S.Ct. 846 , 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). Young’s second and third habeas petitions differ from his first in two significant respects: they include Young’s medical records, and they include the decision of the California Superior Court disposing of his first petition. Young’s first petition was denied by the Superior Court in part because he failed to prove he had been medicated at the time of his plea. Shortly after the denial of reconsideration of the Superi- or Court’s denial of his first petition, Young requested the necessary medical records. It is important to know exactly when he received these records, because the length of time for which his prison transfers deprived him of access…

MEMORANDUM *

Christopher Henry Young, a California prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . 1 The district court dismissed Young’s petition as untimely under the one-year limitation period imposed by the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A); see also Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm.

Young is not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period. To obtain tolling, Young must adequately justify the delay between the denial of his first state habeas petition on September 2, 2004, and the subsequent filing of his second and third state habeas petitions on February 2, 2005. See § 2244(d)(2) (providing tolling during the pendency of a properly filed state habeas petition); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 192-93 , 126 S.Ct. 846 , 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006) (holding that a California habeas petition is timely if filed within a “reasonable time”); see also Waldrip, 548 F.3d at 734 . Young vaguely argues that he was denied access to his “legal files” and “correspondence” during this period, but he introduced no evidence supporting…