Wenrich
Wenrich v. County of Los Angeles
Opinion
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM *
Michael Wenrich and Edward Pechy appeal from the adverse grant of summary judgment holding that the applicable statute of limitations bars their challenge to the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office’s mandatory retirement policy. The facts and prior proceedings are known to the parties, and are restated herein only as necessary.
We determine a limitations period for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by applying the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See, e.g., Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 , 105 S.Ct. 1938 , 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)). Under California law, that period is one year. Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 340 (2005). Federal law, however, determines when a claim accrues. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 923 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1991).
Under federal law, a § 1983 claim accrues when “the plaintiffs know or have reason to know of the injury that is the basis of their action.” RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir.2002). Where an eventual allegedly unconstitutional firing is the result of an earlier operative act — such as the adoption of a policy' —…
Dissenting Opinion
Paez, J.
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that the applicable statute of limitations is one year under California law and that federal law determines when a claim accrues, I do not agree that Appellants’ § 1983 claim accrued when the city adopted its mandatory retirement policy in 1997. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority cites RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002), in support of its determination that Appellants’ claims are time barred. In RK Ventures, we held that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleging discriminatory enforcement of a public nuisance ordinance was time barred because the limitations period began to accrue from the date the city initiated abatement proceedings against the plaintiffs’ nightclub. Rather than considering whether the adoption of the ordinance was the operative decision, we focused on the initiation of the abatement proceedings and the start of the administrative hearing. We determined that the plaintiffs’ claims accrued when the city initiated abatement proceedings. Because the plaintiffs did not know that they would be injured by the ordinance when the city adopted it, the date of its enactment did not…