Roberson

MEMORANDUM **

In this federal habeas corpus proceeding, the appellant Keenan Roberson challenges his California jury conviction of attempted willful, deliberate pre-meditated murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Roberson contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney advised him to reject a plea agreement under which he would have received a 13-year term of imprisonment, and to go to trial, and again when his attorney failed to seek a ten year plea agreement.

The district court properly recognized that federal habeas review is limited by the standard set in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). The district court concluded that Roberson had failed to show that the state court decision rejecting his claims was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). We agree.

*464 In its opinion in the federal habeas proceeding, the district court stated that the attorney so advised Roberson because she believed she “had a triable case” and because she “also believed that a 13-year sentence was too high.” In hindsight, counsel’s…

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Roberson’s attorney’s advice to reject the thirteen-year plea offer satisfied the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for effective assistance of counsel.

As the record reflects, upon taking over the case from a prior attorney, trial counsel advised Roberson to reject the thirteen-year offer because she was unfamiliar with the case, believed she could procure a better offer, and believed she could win at trial. I agree with the majority that this advice did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; but counsel’s duty to advise her client did not end there.

Counsel had a continuing duty to “keep [her] client informed of the developments in the case” and to “explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably necessary to permit [him] to make informed decisions regarding [his] representation.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.8 (3d ed. 1993) (“The Defense Function”); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal…