Wick

Wick v. Barnhart

Good Law
173 F. App'x 597
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMarch 10, 2006No. 04-35579California2,658 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Plaintiff-Appellant Wick appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability benefits and supplemental social security income. Wick contends that the ALJ erred in discrediting her subjective symptom and pain testimony, in rejecting the opinions of various mental health physicians and in finding that she retains the residual functional capacity to perform other work. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedure of this case, we recite them only as necessary to our decision. We reverse and remand.

I.

Because the ALJ determined that Wick suffered from physical and mental impairments, the ALJ could reject her testimony only upon finding “affirmative evidence” of malingering or expressing “clear and convincing reasons” for doing so. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ discredited Wick’s subjective symptom testimony on the grounds that Wick could carry on sufficient daily exertional activities and that her pain complaints were unsupported by objective medical evidence. In addition, the ALJ indicated malingering based on what she characterized as Wick’s “positive…

Dissenting Opinion

Bea, J.

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Because the record contained “affirmative evidence of malingering” and the ALJ made specific findings as to why Wick was not credible, we must defer to the ALJ’s decision to discredit Wick’s testimony. Because the ALJ permissibly discredited Wick’s testimony, and because Wick’s treating psychiatrist found no mental impairment that would affect Wick’s ability to work, the ALJ did not err in failing to consider Wick’s purported psychological and psychiatric limitations at any step in the sequential disability analysis.

I.

The logical implication of the majority memorandum disposition is that, absent a medical expert’s express opinion that a claimant is a malingerer, an ALJ lacks “affirmative evidence of malingering.” None of our cases, however, establishes so stringent a rule. Rather, we must uphold an ALJ’s findings when they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.2001) (“Sub *602 stantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational…

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