Swanson

MEMORANDUM **

Swanson asserts that the delay of 108 days between the initial appearance and preliminary hearing on his supervised release violation, during which time he was housed in “deplorable” conditions, violated his due process rights under Fed. R.CrimP. 32.1. Because Swanson failed to demonstrate that the delay was unreasonable and that he suffered actual prejudice, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the revocation proceedings. 1

Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. 1(b)(1)(A) provides that a preliminary hearing on a supervised release violation “must [be] promptly conducted].” Defendant’s right to such a hearing arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257,1259 (9th Cir.2008). To qualify for relief, our case law requires the defendant to show both (1) an unreasonable delay and (2) actual prejudice. Id. at 1260-61 . We review de novo the district court’s ruling on whether the defendant’s due process rights as incorporated in Rule 32.1 were violated. Id. at 1260 .

Swanson’s claim fails because he did not demonstrate that the delay involved here was unreasonable. Reasonableness involves the balancing of the…