Juvenile
United States v. Juvenile
Opinion
lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
The facts are known to the parties, and are not recounted here.
Viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), sufficient evidence was presented at J.G.-A.’s trial to enable a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that he violated 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) by knowingly and intentionally possessing over 250 pounds of marijuana. The Customs and Border Protection official stationed at the border checkpoint on the date of the incident in question testified at trial and conclusively identified G.-A. as the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle that contained the illegal narcotics. “[T]he testimony of one witness, if solidly believed, is sufficient to prove the identity of a perpetrator of crime.” United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir.1977); see also United States v. Ginn, 87 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir.1996).
Additionally, we have repeatedly held that when a defendant is the driver and sole occupant of a vehicle containing a large amount of illegal narcotics, this is sufficient to support an inference that he *633 knowingly possessed those narcotics with the…
035concurrenceinpart Opinion
Berzon, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the government presented sufficient evidence at trial to support the district court’s adjudication of juvenile delinquency. I take a different view, however, on the question of whether the district court properly considered the rehabilitative aspects of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 , as required by our prior opinion in United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2003), in fashioning the sentencing in this case.
We stated in Juvenile that the rehabilitative function behind the FJDA “requires an assessment of the totality of the unique circumstances and rehabilitative needs of each juvenile.” 347 F.3d at 787 . To that end, we held that “[i]t must be clear from the record, if not explicit, that a district court weighed all of the relevant factors and found that the disposition imposed was the least restrictive means to accomplish a young person’s rehabilitation, given the needs of the child and the community,” and that “the District Court must provide a reasoned basis for why it has rejected less restrictive interventions.” Id. at 787-88 .