Tompkins

MEMORANDUM **

Tompkins’s leg injury does not qualify as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A). Because running is not an activity “of central importance to daily life,” it is not a major life activity. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 , 122 S.Ct. 681 , 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). That Tompkins walks with “some discomfort and a limp” does not establish his ability to walk is “substantially limit[ed].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A). Tompkins’s testimony demonstrates he is not “significantly restricted,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(l)(ii), but rather has for years carried out professional duties and personal interests requiring walking. Tompkins thus fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to a required element of his ADA claim, namely, whether he has a disability for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). Nor is the evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tompkins has a record of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(B).

Tompkins alleges he was treated less favorably than younger deputies in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 623…