Webber

dissenting:

Although this is a close case, given our deferential standard of review I cannot concur with the panel majority’s decision to reverse and to remand for further proceedings. We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it (1) employs the correct legal standard, and (2) is supported by substantial evidence, which amounts to more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2008); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir.2003). Because the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of Webber and her husband as well as the opinion of her treating physician, I respectfully dissent.

I

Webber was insured only through September 30, 2001. Thus, the question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings as to Webber’s disability on that date; her disability after that date is irrelevant. This distinction is overlooked in the panel majority’s conclusion that the ALJ failed to adduce “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discrediting Webber’s testimony on the ba *315 sis of her reported daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996).

A claimant’s daily activities…

MEMORANDUM ***

Vicki Webber appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), and review de novo the district court’s judgment. -See, e.g., Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir.2008). “The Social Security Administration’s disability determination should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). We reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Webber claims the ALJ erred in rejecting her subjective-symptom testimony. We agree. Once an applicant has established the existence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to cause some degree of symptom, an ALJ may reject an applicant’s subjective symptom testimony only by providing “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for doing so. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281-84 (9th Cir.1996). The ALJ’s proffered reasons are not clear and convincing.

The ALJ relied on the lack of objective medical evidence, Webber’s reported daily…