Manning

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent, because, in my view, when Nina Manning made her self-incriminating statements, she was in custody and was not informed of her Miranda rights before she made those incriminating-statements. We review de novo the ultimate question of whether “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2002). Applying this standard of review, I would hold that the district court erred in determining that Manning was not in custody.

I agree with the majority that Manning was not in custody when she first encountered the agents at her home and when they drove her to the NCIS offices. However, “[i]f an individual voluntarily comes to the police station or another location and, once there, the circumstances become such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, the interrogation can become custodial.” Kim, 292 F.3d at 975 . Although Manning may have voluntarily agreed to accompany the agents to the NCIS offices, the interview soon evolved into a custodial…

MEMORANDUM *

Nina Manning appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress statements that she made to Naval Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) agents in connection with the unlawful killing of her infant daughter “J.M.” Manning also *35 appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence that was obtained during a search to which she consented verbally and in writing. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress. See United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir.2006). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Howard, 447 F.3d 1257 , 1262 n. 4 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing to consider Manning’s Motion to Suppress. After such a hearing, a district court’s findings of fact may only be reversed upon a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 , 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452 , 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (articulating the clear error standard of review); Lentini v. California Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 843 (9th…