Alexander

MEMORANDUM *

Petitioner Cevin Alexander appeals the district court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We affirm.

Alexander filed his petition after the time period of the one-year statute of limitations had passed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d). Adopting the recommendations of the magistrate, the district court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, Alexander argues that (1) the district erred in calculating the time period for the statute of limitations and (2) in any event, he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The limitations period begins to run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A). It is tolled while “a *974 properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2). Where a defendant directly appeals his conviction all the way to the state supreme court, the § 2244(d) limitations period begins to run once the defendant’s time to appeal to the United States Supreme Court expires. Bowen v.…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that Alexander’s petition is untimely; I also agree that his inability to make copies would not entitle him to equitable tolling. However, given Alexander’s allegations that he did not have access to legal materials interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and that the prison paralegal incorrectly advised him of when his habeas petition was due, I would find that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling.

We have held that lack of access to legal materials on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which imposes the § 2244 limitations period, can justify equitable tolling. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.2006). In my opinion, the majority reads our precedent and Alexander’s petition too narrowly: it is sufficient to allege, as Alexander has done, that he had no access to case law or other materials interpreting AEDPA’s *976 statute of limitations. The abundance of case law concerning AEDPA’s statute of limitations shows both how complicated the issue can be and how crucial court decisions are to…