Brown
Brown v. Del Papa
Opinion
Dissenting Opinion
Rymer, J.
dissenting.
I part company for three reasons. First, I do not believe the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Bat-son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The prosecutor articulated race neutral reasons for his challenges of two African American prospective jurors. The information on Thrower’s jury form was different from his statement on voir dire; he was also unemployed, and the prosecutor figured he would rather be out looking for a job than serving on the jury. The prosecutor said he had several reasons for excusing Martin, who was employed by the postal service, but could only remember that she didn’t seem to understand a question about working for the federal government given her reply that she worked for the “United States.” While in hindsight this may seem picky or, as the majority puts it, inappropriate, the trial judge was in the best position to assess the prosecutor’s credibility in the context of the overall proceeding as well as the manner in which Martin in fact responded, and had no difficulty with the prosecutor’s explanation. Brown’s only offering was that Martin was a grand juror…
Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM *
Jerome Brown appeals the district court’s denial of the habeas petition he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . Brown argues that the state court’s rejection of his challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), in which he contended that the prosecutor impermissibly used peremptory challenges to strike two African American jurors on the basis of race, constituted an unreasonable application of Batson and re-suited from an unreasonable determination of the facts. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas petition, Bailey v. Rae, 839 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.2003), and we reverse.
Under § 2254, we may grant relief only if the state court’s adjudication of a claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or ... resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d).
“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct…