Odesh

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner, a Chaldean Christian Iraqi citizen, seeks review of the denial of his *690 application for asylum and withholding of removal and of his request for relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief because he found that petitioner was not credible and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirmed. We conclude that the record adequately supports the adverse credibility determination and accordingly deny the petition for review.

We have jurisdiction to review this petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . Where the BIA summarily affirms the IJ’s decision, “we review the IJ’s decision as if it were that of the Board.” Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir.2008). The findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard and a denial of asylum will be affirmed if “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. “Reversal is warranted, however, if the evidence in the record compels a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the IJ’s decision is incorrect.” Id.; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 , 112 S.Ct. 812 ,…

dissenting:

The majority today correctly states that the substantial evidence standard applies to adverse credibility determinations, but in the process refuses to acknowledge the body of Ninth Circuit law outlining when an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) basis for making an adverse credibility determination is itself illegitimate and, thus, not accorded deference upon review. Here, the IJ rested his adverse credibility determination solely on impermissible grounds. I respectfully dissent.

“Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, an adverse credibility finding must be based on specific, cogent reasons, which are substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[W]e will not uphold an adverse credibility determination finding unless the IJ or BIA specifically explains the significance of the discrepancy or points to the petitioner’s obvious evasiveness when asked about it.” Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

Here, the IJ based his adverse credibility determination solely “on the simple fact that [Odesh] could not identify the…