Bonner

MEMORANDUM ***

The district court did not apply the wrong standard in considering Bonner’s equitable tolling argument. Bonner notes that Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 , 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005), held that a petitioner seeking equitable tolling of the time to file a habeas petition must show, among other things, that “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. at 418 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 . He argues that this formulation is more permissive than the standard we enunciated before Pace was decided, namely that a habeas petitioner seeking equitable tolling must show, among other things, that “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time[.]” Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.2005) (citation and quotation signals omitted). We have recently rejected this argument, instead holding that the Supreme Court’s formulation of “extraordinary circumstances” in Pace is consistent with our longstanding formulation. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.2009).

*381 The district court correctly concluded that Bonner did not carry his burden of proving that he is…